Daniel Paul Carpenter

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W e present a model of learning and policy choice across governments. Governments choose policies with known ideological positions but initially unknown valence benefits, possibly learning about those benefits between the model's two periods. There are two variants of the model; in one, governments only learn from their own experiences, whereas in the other(More)
Why and how do groups share information in politics? Most studies of information exchange in politics focus on individual-level attributes and implicitly assume that communication between any two policy actors is independent of the larger communication network in which they are embedded. We develop a theory stating that the decision of any lobbyist to(More)
and three anonymous referees for their particularly helpful comments and discussions. Abstract Do redundant bureaucratic arrangements represent wasteful duplication or a hedge against political uncertainty? Previous attempts at addressing this question have treated agency actions as exogenous, thus avoiding strategic issues such as collective action(More)
The Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa was unprecedented in both its scale and impact. Out of this human calamity has come renewed attention to global health security--its definition, meaning, and the practical implications for programmes and policy. For example, how does a government begin to strengthen its core public health capacities, as(More)
The New Forest National Park is a hotspot for biodiversity in the UK. A long history of grazing by ponies in the New Forest landscape has created a diverse mosaic of habitats that are of international significance. We investigated patterns of species diversity and composition across the New Forest landscape by sampling soil, leaf litter and ground(More)
Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008) present a theoretical model of learning and policy choice across governments. This model is restricted to the simple case of two policy choices, only one of which has initially unknown payoffs. In this note we extend the model to include a second unknown policy. We find that while pure strategy equilibria are no longer(More)
How do the errors of regulators – approving bad products, or rejecting good ones – depend upon the submission strategies and characteristics of submitting private entities or firms? We develop a model of approval regulation in which both firm and regulator are uncertain about the underlying quality of a product, but where the firm is better informed than(More)