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Non-thrombotic PE does not represent a distinct clinical syndrome. It may be due to a variety of embolic materials and result in a wide spectrum of clinical presentations, making the diagnosis difficult. With the exception of severe air and fat embolism, the haemodynamic consequences of non-thrombotic emboli are usually mild. Treatment is mostly supportive(More)
JEL classification: G30 G34 J16 Keywords: Board of directors Board effectiveness Gender Diversity a b s t r a c t We show that female directors have a significant impact on board inputs and firm outcomes. In a sample of US firms, we find that female directors have better attendance records than male directors, male directors have fewer attendance problems(More)
We present an equilibrium theory of the organization of work in an economy where knowledge is an essential input in production and agents are heterogeneous in skill. Agents organize production by matching with others in knowledge hierarchies designed to use and communicate their knowledge efficiently. Relative to autarky, organization leads to larger(More)
workshops, where earlier versions of the paper were presented under different titles. We would also like to thank Nick Bradley, Ian Byrne, George Dallas, and Laurie Kizik for providing us with S&P Transparency Rankings and CLSA Corporate Governance Scores, Mara Faccio and Larry Lang for their generosity in sharing their ownership data, and Vlad Charniauski(More)
While previous empirical literature has examined the effect of founder-CEOs on Þrm performance , it has largely ignored the effect of Þrm performance on founder-CEO status. In this paper, we use instrumental variables methods to better understand the relationship between founder-CEOs and performance. Using the proportion of the Þrm's founders that are dead(More)
The present theoretical framework of Alzheimer's disease proposes that pathophysiological changes occur 10-20 years before the diagnosis of dementia. We addressed the question of how age-related changes in gray matter mediate the cognitive performance during middle age. Eighty-two participants (40-50 years, ±2) were assessed with a comprehensive(More)
We argue that powerful CEOs induce their boards to shift the weight on performance measures towards the better performing measures, thereby rigging the incentive part of their pay. The intuition is developed in a simple model in which some powerful CEOs exploit superior information and lack of transparency in compensation contracts to extract rents. The(More)
Many corporations reward their outside directors with a modest fee for each board meeting they attend. Using a large panel data set on director attendance behavior in publicly-listed firms for the period 1996–2003, we provide robust evidence that directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings when board meeting fees are higher. This(More)