Daniel Markovits

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II. LUMPINESS, GRANULARITY, AND SHAREABLE GOODS....................... 296 A. Renewable Resources................................................................... 298 B. Rapidly Decaying Resources ....................................................... 300 C. Lumpiness in General .................................................................. 301 D.(More)
Much has been made of the shareholder franchise as a lever of corporate governance, but there is little empirical evidence about the efficacy of voting. This paper empirically examines votes on management sponsored resolutions. Per stock exchange rules, many executive compensation plans must be approved by shareholders. The paper finds stunning(More)
We studied the distributional preferences of an elite cadre of Yale Law School students, a group that will assume positions of power in U.S. society. Our experimental design allows us to test whether redistributive decisions are consistent with utility maximization and to decompose underlying preferences into two qualitatively different tradeoffs:(More)
We report a laboratory experiment that enables us to distinguish preferences for altruism (concerning tradeoffs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others) from social preferences (concerning tradeoffs between the payoffs of others). By using graphical representations of three-person Dictator Games that vary the relative prices of giving, we generate a(More)
We study the impact of exposure to ideology on distributional preferences in the context of modified Dictator Games that vary the price of giving. We exploiting a natural experiment in education — random assignment to first-term instructors at the Yale Law School — in order to distinguish the self-selection into a discipline from the learning that education(More)
In IP scholarship, patents are commonly understood as more efficient than other approaches to innovation policy. Their primary ostensible advantage is allocative: as a form of property rights, patents act as a conduit between market signals and potential innovators, ostensibly guiding investment toward inventions with the most social value. Existing(More)
Market damages – the difference between the market price for goods or services at the time of breach and the contract price – are the best default rule whenever parties trade in thick markets: they induce parties to contract efficiently and to trade if and only if trade is efficient, and they do not create ex ante inefficiencies. Courts commonly overlook(More)