Daniel Markovits

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We study individual preferences for giving. Our experiments employ a graphical interface that allows subjects to see geometric representations of choice sets on a computer screen and to make decisions through a simple point-and-We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual level data. Our baseline experiment employs(More)
We report a laboratory experiment that enables us to distinguish preferences for altruism (concerning tradeoffs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others) from social preferences (concerning tradeoffs between the payoffs of others). By using graphical representations of three-person Dictator Games that vary the relative prices of giving, we generate a(More)
We study the impact of exposure to ideology on distributional preferences in the context of modified Dictator Games that vary the price of giving. We exploiting a natural experiment in education — random assignment to first-term instructors at the Yale Law School — in order to distinguish the self-selection into a discipline from the learning that education(More)
  • Anne Alstott, Scott Altman, Jennifer Arlen, Stephen Bainbridge, Yochai Benkler, Hanoch Dagan +28 others
  • 2006
abstract. As Aristotle recognized in The Politics, the household is an indispensable building block of social, economic, and political life. A liberal society grants its citizens far wider berth to arrange their households than to choose their familial and marital relationships. Legal commentators, however, have devoted far more attention to the family and(More)
We studied the distributional preferences of an elite cadre of Yale Law School students, a group that will assume positions of power in U.S. society. Our experimental design allows us to test whether redistributive decisions are consistent with utility maximization and to decompose underlying preferences into two qualitatively different tradeoffs:(More)
3 The psychological experiments commonly test for one bias at a time. Subjects may perform well in economics experiments because (i) they are free from bias, (ii) their biases offset so they act as if they are free from bias, or (iii) the market mechanism ameliorates the subjects' errors. Besharov (2004) analyzes the effect of offsetting biases. This paper(More)
This paper reports a rigorous experimental test of Pareto-damaging behaviors. We introduce a new graphical representation of dictator games with step-shaped sets of feasible payoffs to persons self and other on which strongly Pareto efficient allocations involve substantial inequality. The non-convexity and sharp nonlinearity of the Pareto frontier allow us(More)
We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual-level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff-pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences * The results reported here were previously distributed in three different papers(More)
  • Timur Kuran, Bruce Ackerman, Luz Marina Arias, Bas Van Bavel, Jenna Bednar, Fahad Bishara +18 others
  • 2015
In the legal system of the pre-modern Middle East the closest thing to an autonomous private organization was the Islamic waqf. This non-state institution inhibited political participation, collective action, and rule of law, among other indicators of democratization. It did so through several mechanisms. Its activities were essentially set by its founder,(More)
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