• Publications
  • Influence
Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from Ebay
Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation onExpand
A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange
It is hypothesized that this area is involved in integrating theory-of-mind processing with cooperative actions in prefrontal cortex, and data is reported from a functional MRI experiment designed to test this hypothesis. Expand
Emotion expression in human punishment behavior.
Data from ultimatum games support the view that costly punishment might itself be used to express negative emotions and suggest that future studies will benefit by recognizing that human demand for emotion expression can have significant behavioral consequences in social environments, including families, courts, companies, and markets. Expand
Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments
There has been substantial recent interest in determining why there is cooperation in public goods experiments even in environments that provide all subjects with the incentive to free ride (seeExpand
Distinguishing trust from risk: An anatomy of the investment game
The role of trust in promoting economic activity and societal development has received considerable academic attention by social scientists. A popular way to measure trust at the individual level isExpand
Emotion regulation and decision making under risk and uncertainty.
Evidence is offered that the increased effectiveness of cognitive reappraisal in reducing the experience of emotions underlies its beneficial effects on decision making. Expand
Fairness and Cheating
We present evidence from a laboratory experiment that individuals who feel having been treated unfairly in the interaction with others are more likely to cheat in a subsequent, unrelated game. WeExpand
Experiments investigating cooperative types in humans: a complement to evolutionary theory and simulations.
The results support the view that the human subject population is in a stable, polymorphic equilibrium of types, and find that the subjects fall into three types, an individual's type is stable, and a group's cooperative outcomes can be remarkably well predicted if one knows its type composition. Expand
Disposition, History and Contributions in Public Goods Experiments
Private incentives to invest in a public good are modeled as self- interested reciprocity where individuals use reputational scoring rules to determine their optimal level of investment. The modelExpand
When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation
Findings lend support to the view that credible threats of sanctions generate a “cognitive shift” that crowds-out norm-based motivations and increases the likelihood of income-maximizing behavior. Expand