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Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance
We show that female directors have a significant impact on board inputs and firm outcomes. In a sample of US firms, we find that female directors have better attendance records than male directors,Expand
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A Theory of Friendly Boards
We analyze the consequences of the board's dual role as advisor as well as monitor of management. Given this dual role, the CEO faces a trade-off in disclosing information to the board: If he revealsExpand
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Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance
We show that female directors have a significant impact on board inputs and firm outcomes. In a sample of US firms, we find that female directors have better attendance records than male directors,Expand
  • 101
  • 21
Boards of Banks
We show that country characteristics explain most of the cross-sectional variation in bank board independence. In contrast, country characteristics have little explanatory power for the fraction ofExpand
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Strong Managers, Weak Boards?
Many governance reform proposals are based on the view that boards have been too friendly to executives, for example, by awarding them excessive pay. Although boards are often on friendly terms withExpand
Regulatory Pressure and Bank Directors' Incentives to Attend Board Meetings
The primary way in which directors obtain necessary information is by attending board meetings. Bank directors, in particular, are strongly urged to attend meetings by regulators. We investigateExpand
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Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance
Sah (1991) conjectured that more centralized societies should have more volatile performances than less centralized ones. We show in this paper that this is true both for cross-country andExpand
Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets
We show that adverse selection in the labor market may generate negative assortative matching of workers and firms. In a model in which employers asymmetrically learn about the ability of theirExpand