Daniel Diermeier

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The so-called “paradox of voting” is a major anomaly for rational choice theories of elections. If voting is costly and citizens are rational, then in large electrorates the expected turnout would be small, for if many people voted the chance of anyone being pivotal would be too small to make the act worthwhile. Yet many people do vote, even in large(More)
Theories in political economy depend critically on assumptions about motivations of politicians. Our analysis starts from the premise that politicians, like other economic agents, are rational individuals who make career decisions by comparing the expected returns of alternative choices. The main goal of the paper is to quantify the returns to a career in(More)
Activist NGOs have increasingly foregone public politics and turned to private politics to change the practices of firms and industries. This paper focuses on private politics, activist strategies, and nonmarket strategies of targets. A formal theory of an encounter between an activist organization and a target is presented to examine strategies for(More)
Many natural and social systems display global organization and coordination without centralized control. The origin of this global coordination is a topic of great current interest. Here we investigate a density-classification task as a model system for coordination and information processing in decentralized systems. We show that sophisticated strategies,(More)
Recently there has been increasing interest in constructing general-purpose political opinion classifiers for applications in eRulemaking. This problem is generally modeled as a sentiment classification task in a new domain. However, the classification accuracy is not as good as that in other domains such as customer reviews. In this paper, we report the(More)
In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies that accounts for the following phenomena: (1) Cabinet terminations due to replacement or early election (2) Cabinet reshuf°es (3) Minority and Surplus governments; (4) the relative instability of minority governments. JEL classi ̄cation: D72, H19,(More)
A straightforward extension of the standard Stigler-Peltzman model of regulation, coupled with a Taagepera-Shugart analysis of electoral-system effects, suggests: (a) that the greater seat-vote elasticities of majoritarian electoral systems will tilt policy in favor of consumers, while proportional systems should strengthen producers; and (b) that the(More)
Both normative theories of ethics in philosophy and contemporary models of moral judgment in psychology have focused almost exclusively on the permissibility of acts, in particular whether acts should be judged on the basis of their material outcomes (consequentialist ethics) or on the basis of rules, duties, and obligations (deontological ethics). However,(More)