Dana Sisak

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In a randomized field experiment, we investigate the interplay between work goals, monetary incentives, and work performance. Employees are observed in a natural work environment where they have to do a simple, effort-intense task. Output is perfectly observable and workers are paid for performance. While a regular piece-rate contract serves as a benchmark,(More)
We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion bene…ts attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no(More)
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, with the ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in core areas of finance. Abstract: This paper o¤ers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The(More)
We analyze a dynamic contest between two players who compete for a prize over a fixed number of stages. The player who is ahead at the end wins regardless of the history of the game. We find that if contestants are symmetric, their efforts will always be the same in the last stage of the contest. For all stages except the first and last equilibrium effort(More)
Fear of failure can dominate the choices of individuals. We model its role in the decision to become an entrepreneur and subsequent investments made in pursuit of success using the framework of loss aversion. We show that when the threshold for success is su¢ ciently high, fear of failure motivates additional sacri…ces by entrepreneurs. When the threshold(More)
In a randomized field experiment, we investigate the connection between work goals, monetary incentives, and work performance. Employees are observed in a natural work environment where they have to do a simple, but effort-intense task. Output is perfectly observable and workers are paid for performance. While a regular piece-rate contract serves as a(More)
We study relative performance schemes in light of social preferences. To the extent players are other regarding, they internalize the negative externality they impose on other players by exerting lower e¤ort. Thus, players with other regarding preferences are more likely to initiate and sustain collusive behavior, as traditionally de…ned. We …nd this is(More)
We study optimal fee setting decisions by a monopoly online platform connecting advertisers with potential buyers in two environments: (1) a simple model that captures stylized features of advertising on search engines, social networks, and ad-supported email, and (2) a richer model that is more relevant for " directed " search at price comparison sites.(More)