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OBJECTIVE The "default mode" has been defined as a baseline condition of brain function and is of interest because its component brain regions are believed to be abnormal in schizophrenia. It was hypothesized that the default mode network would show abnormal activation and connectivity in patients with schizophrenia. METHOD Patients with schizophrenia(More)
  • Dan Lloyd
  • 2002
Functional brain imaging offers new opportunities for the study of that most pervasive of cognitive conditions, human consciousness. Since consciousness is attendant to so much of human cognitive life, its study requires secondary analysis of multiple experimental datasets. Here, four preprocessed datasets from the National fMRI Data Center are considered:(More)
Psychology is the rollercoaster of the sciences. In its brief history, psychology has swung through many-isms, alternately embracing and rejecting the widest variety of assumptions and fi rst principles. In the decades ahead, psychology is once again facing metamorphoses, in its tectonic collision with neuroscience. This changing landscape is of profound(More)
  • D Lloyd
  • 2000
Because lesions usually affect contiguous areas of the brain, cognitive neuropsychology has generally posited modularity of brain function, assuming that specific regions of the brain have specific dedicated functions. However, a review of 36 published functional neuroimaging studies suggests that functions are distributed over multiple regions. Or, in(More)
Cognitive neuroscience typically develops hypotheses to explain phenomena that are localized in space and time. Specific regions of the brain execute characteristic functions, whose causes and effects are prompt; determining these functions in spatial and temporal isolation is generally regarded as the first step toward understanding the coherent operation(More)
Good research requires, among other virtues, (i) methods that yield stable experimental observations without arbitrary (post hoc) assumptions, (ii) logical interpretations of the sources of observations, and (iii) sound inferences to general causal mechanisms explaining experimental results by placing them in larger explanatory contexts. In The New(More)
" Sensation's Ghost " identifies one type of non-sensory experience, the quasi-feelings that attend perception, inflecting them vaguely and globally. Following Husserl, I suggest that non-sensory awareness includes much more than the fringe elements Mangan discusses. Every perceptual property can be either sensed, or apprehended in a non-sensory manner.(More)
C ould " cognitive neuroscience " be an oxymoron? " Cognitive " and " neurosci-ence " cohere only to the extent that the entities identified as " cognitive " can be coordinated with entities identified as neural. This coordination is typically construed as intertheoretic reduction between " levels " of scientific description. On the cognitive side, folk(More)