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Most modern cryptographic primitives are heavy consumers of randomness. These schemes are provably secure when uniform randomness is available. Random Number Generators (RNGs) often fail to provide high-quality randomness in practice due to poor design, insufficient entropy, bugs, etc. Randomness failures can be catastrophic. Motivation Our Contributions(More)
In a cold boot attack a cryptosystem is compromised by analysing a noisy version of its internal state. For instance, if a computer is rebooted the memory contents are rarely fully reset; instead, after the reboot an adversary might recover a noisy image of the old memory contents and use it as a stepping stone for reconstructing secret keys. While such(More)
Usenix 2008-Halderman et al. noted that DRAMs retain their contents for a while after power is lost. Bits in memory can be extracted, but they will have errors. 0 bits will always flip with very low probability (<1%), but 1 bits will flip with much higher probability which increases with time. Why is this a problem? Secrets may be stored in memory. The Big(More)
This paper revisits related randomness attacks against public key encryption schemes as introduced by Paterson, Schuldt and Sibborn (PKC 2014). We present a general transform achieving security for public key encryption in the related randomness setting using as input any secure public key encryption scheme in combination with an auxiliary-input(More)
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