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In a cold boot attack a cryptosystem is compromised by analysing a noisy version of its internal state. For instance, if a computer is rebooted the memory contents are rarely fully reset; instead, after the reboot an adversary might recover a noisy image of the old memory contents and use it as a stepping stone for reconstructing secret keys. While such(More)
Usenix 2008-Halderman et al. noted that DRAMs retain their contents for a while after power is lost. Bits in memory can be extracted, but they will have errors. 0 bits will always flip with very low probability (<1%), but 1 bits will flip with much higher probability which increases with time. Why is this a problem? Secrets may be stored in memory. The Big(More)
Most modern cryptographic primitives are heavy consumers of randomness. These schemes are provably secure when uniform randomness is available. Random Number Generators (RNGs) often fail to provide high-quality randomness in practice due to poor design, insufficient entropy, bugs, etc. Randomness failures can be catastrophic. Motivation Our Contributions(More)
This paper revisits related randomness attacks against public key encryption schemes as introduced by Paterson, Schuldt and Sibborn (PKC 2014). We present a general transform achieving security for public key encryption in the related randomness setting using as input any secure public key encryption scheme in combination with an auxiliary-input(More)
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