• Publications
  • Influence
Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions
We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find
Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and its Role in Managerial Compensation
Though widely used in executive compensation, inside debt has been almost entirely overlooked by prior work. We initiate this research by studying CEO pension arrangements in 237 large capitalization
Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors
I study incentives received by outside directors in Fortune 500 firms from compensation, replacement, and the opportunity to obtain other directorships. Previous research has only shown these
CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis
We study whether CEO involvement in the selection of new directors influences the nature of appointments to the board. When the CEO serves on the nominating committee or no nominating committee
Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements
This paper analyzes company disclosures of CEO stock option values in compliance with the SEC's regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Companies appear to exploit the
Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? An Economic Appraisal
A bona fide currency functions as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account, but bitcoin largely fails to satisfy these criteria. Bitcoin has achieved only scant consumer
Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt Incentives
Pensions and deferred compensation represent substantial components of CEO incentives. We study stockholder and bondholder reactions to companies’ initial reports of CEOs’ inside debt positions
Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns
This paper studies perquisites of major company CEOs, focusing on personal use of company planes. For firms that have disclosed this managerial benefit, average shareholder returns under-perform