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Let’s Pretend!
According to many, joint intentional action must be understood in terms of joint intentions. Most accounts of joint intention appeal to a set of sophisticated individual intentional states. TheExpand
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From extended mind to collective mind
  • D. Tollefsen
  • Psychology, Computer Science
  • Cognitive Systems Research
  • 1 June 2006
TLDR
In this paper, I attempt to undermine one of the motivations for refusing to acknowledge groups as the bearers of mental states. Expand
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Thrombin‐inhibiting perfluorocarbon nanoparticles provide a novel strategy for the treatment and magnetic resonance imaging of acute thrombosis
Summary.  Background: As a regulator of the penultimate step in the coagulation cascade, thrombin represents a principal target of direct and specific anticoagulants. Objective: A potent thrombinExpand
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Naturalizing joint action: A process-based approach
Numerous philosophical theories of joint agency and its intentional structure have been developed in the past few decades. These theories have offered accounts of joint agency that appeal toExpand
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  • PDF
Groups as Agents
In the social sciences and in everyday speech we often talk about groups as if they behaved in the same way as individuals, thinking and acting as a singular being. We say for example that "GoogleExpand
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Organizations as true believers
Rejetant les hypotheses de la metaphore et de l'erreur, l'A. defend la these selon laquelle on peut attribuer des etats intentionnels aux organisations, etatiques ou corporatistes, en vue d'expliquerExpand
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COLLECTIVE EPISTEMIC AGENCY
Who Knows? According to contemporary analytic epistemology only individuals do. This individualistic bias is present in standard analyses of knowledge. The “S” of “S knows that p” is always anExpand
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Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences
In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed theseExpand
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