• Publications
  • Influence
Imperfect competition with complements and substitutes
  • D. Quint
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • 1 July 2014
TLDR
We show sufficient conditions for a discrete-choice demand system to yield demand for each product which is log-concave in price, and has log-increasing differences in own and another product's price, leading to strong comparative statics results. Expand
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Pooling with Essential and Nonessential Patents
Several recent technological standards were accompanied by patent pools?arrangements to license relevant intellectual property as a package. A key distinction made by regulators?between patentsExpand
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Indicative Bidding in Auctions with Costly Entry ∗
When selling a business by auction, investment banks frequently use indicative bids – nonbinding preliminary bids – to select a limited number of bidders for participation in the auction. We showExpand
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A simple test for moment inequality models with an application to English auctions
Testable predictions of many economic models involve inequality comparisons between transformations of nonparametric functionals. We introduce an econometric test for these types of restrictionsExpand
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Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
I compare the value of information acquired secretly with information acquired openly prior to a first-price common-value auction. Novel information (information which is independent of the otherExpand
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Identification in Symmetric English Auctions with Additively Separable Unobserved Heterogeneity
I consider identification of a symmetric, independent private values model with additively separable unobserved heterogeneity from observation of winning bids in English auctions. If the number ofExpand
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Identification and Testing in Ascending Auctions with Unobserved Heterogeneity
This paper empirically studies the consequences of unobserved heterogeneity on auction design. Unobserved heterogeneity in the objects for sale induces correlation among bidders’ valuations, whichExpand
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New cases of almost periodic factorization of triangular matrix functions.
and theFourier coefficientM λ(f ) := M (e−λf ). (These definitions are standard; see [4] and [14].) Of course, M (f ) = M 0(f ). For f ∈ APP written in the form (1.1),M λj (f ) = cj . TheFourierExpand
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Estimation in English auctions with unobserved heterogeneity
We propose a framework for identification and estimation of a private values model with unobserved heterogeneity from bid data in English auctions, using variation in the number of bidders acrossExpand
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Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
TLDR
This paper presents a new non-cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining. Expand
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