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Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms
© 2013 David Plunkett & Tim Sundell This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. Introduction.1 In The Language of Morals, R.M. Hare introducesExpand
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Conceptual Ethics I
Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world, and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field thatExpand
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A POSITIVIST ROUTE FOR EXPLAINING HOW FACTS MAKE LAW
In “How Facts Make Law” and other recent work, Mark Greenberg argues that legal positivists cannot develop a viable constitutive account of law that meets what he calls the “the rational-relationExpand
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Conceptual Ethics II
Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world, and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field thatExpand
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Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry*
In this article, we propose a novel account of general jurisprudence by situating it within the broader project of metanormative inquiry. We begin by showing how general jurisprudence is parallel toExpand
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Weak and Strong Necessity Modals On linguistic means of expressing “ a primitive concept ought ” *
This paper develops an account of the meaning of ‘ought’, and the distinction between weak necessity modals (‘ought’, ‘should’) and strong necessity modals (‘must’, ‘have to’). I argue that there isExpand
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Conceptual Ethics and the Methodology of Normative Inquiry
One of the striking features of normative theorizing in philosophy (as well as in related fields, such as political theory) is the diversity of concepts that feature centrally in it. In particular,Expand
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DWORKIN'S INTERPRETIVISM AND THE PRAGMATICS OF LEGAL DISPUTES*
One of Ronald Dworkin's most distinctive claims in legal philosophy is that law is an interpretative concept, a special kind of concept whose correct application depends neither on fixed criteria norExpand
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Constructing Protagorean Objectivity
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Weak and Strong Necessity Modals
This paper develops an account of the meaning of ‘ought’, and the distinction between weak necessity modals (‘ought’, ‘should’) and strong necessity modals (‘must’, ‘have to’). I argue that there isExpand
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