Author pages are created from data sourced from our academic publisher partnerships and public sources.
- Publications
- Influence
The density of random close packing of spheres
- G. D. Scott, D. Kilgour
- Physics
- 1 June 1969
Models of randomly packed hard spheres exhibit some features of the properties of simple liquids, e.g. the packing density and the radial distribution. The value of the maximum packing density of… Expand
Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections
- D. Kilgour
- Political Science
- 2010
Approval voting is a well-known voting procedure for single-winner elections. Voters approve of as many candidates as they like, and the candidate with the most approvals wins (Brams and Fishburn… Expand
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution: Past, Present, and Future
- D. Kilgour, K. Hipel
- Computer Science
- 7 December 2005
TLDR
A minimax procedure for electing committees
- S. Brams, D. Kilgour, M. Sanver
- 28 April 2007
Abstract
A new voting procedure for electing committees, called the minimax procedure, is described. Based on approval balloting, it chooses the committee that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance… Expand
The graph model for conflicts
- D. Kilgour, K. Hipel, L. Fang
- Computer Science
- Autom.
- 1987
TLDR
A case-based distance model for multiple criteria ABC analysis
- Y. Chen, K. Li, D. Kilgour, K. Hipel
- Mathematics, Computer Science
- Comput. Oper. Res.
- 1 March 2008
TLDR
Fallback Bargaining
- S. Brams, D. Kilgour
- 2001
Under fallback bargaining, bargainers begin by indicating their preference rankings over alternatives. They then fall back, in lockstep, to less and less preferred alternatives – starting with first… Expand
Satisfaction Approval Voting
- S. Brams, D. Kilgour
- Political Science
- 14 April 2010
We propose a new voting system, satisfaction approval voting (SAV), for multiwinner elections, in which voters can approve of as many candidates or as many parties as they like. However, the winners… Expand
The paradox of multiple elections
- S. Brams, D. Kilgour, W. Zwicker
- Economics
- 27 February 1998
Abstract. Assume that voters must choose between voting yes (Y) and voting no (N) on three propositions on a referendum. If the winning combination is NYY on the first, second, and third… Expand
Elicitation of Probabilities Using Competitive Scoring Rules
- D. Kilgour, Y. Gerchak
- Computer Science, Economics
- Decis. Anal.
- 1 June 2004
TLDR