• Publications
  • Influence
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
We develop a new version of prospect theory that employs cumulative rather than separable decision weights and extends the theory in several respects. This version, called cumulative prospect theory,
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
TLDR
Three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty are described: representativeness, availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development.
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk Econometrica 47
A lubricator valve apparatus adapted for use when running wireline tools into an offshore well during a production test of the well. The valve includes a valve body having a central flow passage and
Prospect theory: analysis of decision under risk
Analysis of decision making under risk has been dominated by expected utility theory, which generally accounts for people's actions. Presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive
Thinking, Fast and Slow
Daniel Kahneman, recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his seminal work in psychology challenging the rational model of judgment and decision making, is one of the world's most
The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice.
The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
  • D. Kahneman
  • Psychology
    The American psychologist
  • 1 September 2003
TLDR
Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes.
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with Amos Tversky (1937-1996) during a long and unusually close collaboration. Together, we explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and
Choices, Values, and Frames
We discuss the cognitive and the psy- chophysical determinants of choice in risky and risk- less contexts. The psychophysics of value induce risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking in
...
...