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The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes
This work measures a priori voting power in social choice theory, presenting a systematic and critical examination of a priori voting, and analyzing the foundations and methodological assumptions
The measurement of voting power
This book is the first of its kind: a monograph devoted to a systematic critical examination and exposition of the theory of a priori voting power. This important branch of social-choice theory
Ternary voting games
We define ternary voting games $(TVGs)$, a generalization of simple voting games $(SVGs)$. In a play of an SVG each voter has just two options: voting `yes' or `no'. In a TVG a third option is added:
The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
It is concluded that the first of these decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU is an improvement on the current decision rule; but the other two have extremely undesirable features.
Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power — A critical re-appraisal
This paper re-evaluates the problem of measuring thea priori relative voting power of a voter in an assembly. We propose several new intuitively compelling postualtes that any reasonable index of
Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?
It is shown that when votingPower is understood as influence (I-power), forming a voluntary bloc may be advantageous even if its voting power is smaller than the sum of the original powers of its members; and it may be disadvantageous even if it is greater than that sum.
Review of Paradoxes Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate
Three factors motivated me to write this chapter: The recent passage (25 February 2010) by the British House of Commons of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill, clause #29 of which states
Enlargement of the EU and weighted voting in its council of ministers
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Ternary voting games
TheResponsiveness (ordegree of democratic participation) of a TVG is defined and the most responsive TVGs are determined, for each voters, which are more responsive than the corresponding SVGs.
The weighted voting rule in the EU's Council of Ministers, 1958–1995: Intentions and outcomes
We consider the qualified majority voting rule in the Council of Ministers (CM) of the European Union (EU). Using the Banzhaf index--which, we argue, is the most appropriate for measuring the a