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The Extended Mind
Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the intuitive demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and
The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory
I. PRELIMINARIES 1. Two Concepts of Mind 2. Supervenience and Explanation II. THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 3. Can Consciousness be Reductively Explained? 4. Naturalistic Dualism 5. The Paradox
The Representational Character of Experience
Consciousness and intentionality are perhaps the two central phenomena in the philosophy of mind. Human beings are conscious beings: there is something it is like to be us. Human beings are
The Singularity: a Philosophical Analysis
What happens when machines become more intelligent than humans? One view is that this event will be followed by an explosion to ever-greater levels of intelligence, as each generation of machines
What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness
The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems,
Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation
Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say
Strong and Weak Emergence
The term ‘emergence’ often causes confusion in science and philosophy, as it is used to express at least two quite different concepts. We can label these concepts strong emergence and weak emergence.
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to
A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition
A systematic framework is developed that addresses questions about computation, and advocates a kind of minimal computationalism, compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind, which allows computation to serve as a true foundation for cognitive science.