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The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations
  • D. Baird
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Legal Studies
  • 1 January 1986
A BANKRUPTCY proceeding is a day of reckoning for all parties with ownership interests in an insolvent firm. Ownership interests are valued, the assets are sold, and the proceeds are divided amongExpand
The End of Bankruptcy
The law of corporate reorganizations is conventionally justified as a way to preserve a firm's going-concern value: Specialized assets in a particular firm are worth more together in that firm thanExpand
Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance
Traditional approaches to corporate governance focus exclusively on shareholders and neglect the large and growing role of creditors. Today's creditors craft elaborate covenants that give them aExpand
Managerial Entrenchment and Debt Maturity : Theory and Evidence ∗
Debt maturity theories have emphasized the role of short-term debt in reducing the agency problem between managers and shareholders. In this paper I argue that the maturity structure choice itself isExpand
Chapter 11 at Twilight
In The End of Bankruptcy we detailed the forces that have rendered obsolete traditional conceptions of corporate reorganization. In a response to our article, Lynn LoPucki asserts that our paperExpand
The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study
This paper shows that the dynamics of Chapter 11 turn dramatically on the size of the business. The vast majority of the assets administered in Chapter 11 are concentrated in a handful of largeExpand
Game theory and the law
Preface Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior Bibliographic Notes Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game The Normal Form Game Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes TheExpand
The initiation problem in bankruptcy
American bankruptcy law provides creditors of a corporate debtor with an alternative way of sorting out their claims to the debtor’s assets. Bankruptcy differs from ordinary avenues of debtExpand
The aïstopod amphibians surveyed
A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations
THE traditional view of bankruptcy law begins with the idea that diverse general creditors of a firm face a collective action problem when their corporate debtor becomes insolvent. These generalExpand