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In this paper characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "fat cats and top dogs" taxonomy of(More)
This paper explores the links between international trade theory and the practice of trade and industrial policy in open economies, with special attention to three areas where theoretical lessons have been misunderstood in policy debates. I argue that the 'concertina rule' for tariff reform justifies reductions in high tariffs, but not moves towards(More)
In this paper we consider the case for subsidies towards firms which generate R&D spillovers in open economies. We show that many expected results are overturned in the presence of strategic behaviour by firms. Local R&D spillovers to other domestic firms may justify an R&D tax rather than a subsidy; R&D cooperation by local firms over-internalises the(More)
This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D(More)
We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide where to locate. Firms choose to locate either in a country where employment protection implies costly output adjustments or in one without adjustment costs. Using a two-period three-stage game with uncertainty it is demonstrated that location is influenced by both flexibility and strategic concerns.(More)
number PTA-026-27-0327) and the Leverhulme Trust (programme grant F114/BF) is also gratefully acknowledged. All errors are entirely my own. Abstract We examine two questions, both motivated by an empirical regularity. First, when are incumbent firms' foreign direct investment (FDI) and R&D expenditures positively associated in equilibrium in an(More)
This paper examines the trade-off between strategic investment commitment and flexibility under oligopoly. Facing demand uncertainty, firms decide whether to commit to investment early or wait until the uncertainty has been resolved. Two endogenous timing games are considered which differ in their characterisation of commitment. We show how uncertainty, the(More)
This paper examines Foreign Direct Investment in the presence of labour unions. An oligopoly model is developed in which identical firms locate in a host country in order to export to a foreign country. These firms are unionised and compete with foreign firms on the foreign market. We consider the incentives for social dumping via restrictive labour(More)