Cyrille Imbert

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Experiments (E), computer simulations (CS) and thought experiments (TE) are usually seen as playing different roles in science and as having different epistemologies. Accordingly, they are usually analyzed separately. We argue in this paper that these activities can contribute to answering the same questions by playing the same epistemic role when they are(More)
Epistemic accounts of scientific collaboration usually assume that, one way or another, two heads really are more than twice better than one. We show that this hypothesis is unduly strong. We present a deliberately crude model with unfavorable hypotheses. We show that, even then, when the priority rule is applied, large differences in successfulness can(More)
In this paper, I criticize Bedau’s definition of ‘diachronically emergent properties’ (DEPs), which says that a property is a DEP if it can only be predicted by a simulation (simulation requirement) and is nominally emergent. I argue at length that this definition is not complete because it fails to eliminate trivial cases. I discuss the features that an(More)
According to the „experimenter‟s regress‟, disputes about the validity of experimental results cannot be closed by objective facts because no conclusive criteria other than the outcome of the experiment itself exist for deciding whether the experimental apparatus was functioning properly or not. Given the frequent characterization of simulations as(More)
Why are some models, like the harmonic oscillator, the Ising model, a few Hamiltonian in quantum mechanics, Poisson equation, or Lokta-Volterra equations, repeatedly used within and across scientific domains, whereas theories allow for much more modeling possibilities? Some historians and philosophers of science have already proposed plausible explanations.(More)
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