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Inhibin has long been considered as a suppresser of follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) secretion from anterior pituitary through pituitary-gonad negative feedback to regulate follicle development. We demonstrated that addition of inhibin A could significantly suppress FSH-induced FSHR mRNA level in cultured rat granulosa cells (GCs) measured by real-time… (More)
This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the auction the winning bid is made public. Bidders may signal… (More)
We reconsider the justifications of the R&D subsidies of Spencer and Brander (1983), by allowing firms to form a research joint venture (RJV) and license innovations. If governments offer unconditional subsidies, an RJV is formed and the strategic benefits of R&D subsidies vanish. Nevertheless, governments subsidize their domestic firms to enhance their… (More)
We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlist-ing is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore whether the procurer should reimburse the nonrecoverable cost of preparing a bid in whole or in part. We find that a… (More)
The present paper reconsiders the inside innovators' licensing problem under incomplete information. Employing an optimal mechanism design approach, we show that, contrary to what is claimed in the literature, the optimal mechanism may prescribe fixed fees, royalty rates lower than the cost reduction, and even negative royalty rates.
R&D rivalry and optimal R&D policies are investigated in an asymmetric four-stage game that involves international licensing. It is found that a government's R&D policy crucially depends on its domestic firm's bargaining power over the licensing gain. When the firm's bargaining power is greater than one half, the government subsidizes its home firm's R&D… (More)
1 We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their inspiring comments. Abstract We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits… (More)