Cuihong Fan

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RING finger proteins play important roles in spermatogenesis. Here, we report that a novel RING finger protein RNF151, with a C3HC4-type RING finger domain, a putative nuclear localization signal (NLS), and a TRAF-type zinc finger domain, was exclusively expressed in the mouse testis and developmentally regulated during spermatogenesis. While RNF151 mRNA(More)
Inhibin has long been considered as a suppresser of follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) secretion from anterior pituitary through pituitary-gonad negative feedback to regulate follicle development. We demonstrated that addition of inhibin A could significantly suppress FSH-induced FSHR mRNA level in cultured rat granulosa cells (GCs) measured by real-time(More)
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer. — Department of Economics — University of Bonn — D-53113 Bonn, Phone: +49(0228)739220 — Fax: +49(0228)739221 * Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, School of Economics Email: cuihongf@mail.shufe.edu.cn ** Sung-Buk Ku An-am Dong 5-1, Seoul 136-701, Korea, Email: bhjun@korea.ac.kr *** Corresponding Author: Institute(More)
The biological activities of fullerene derivatives have attracted much attention in the last decade. In this paper, effects of dimalonic acid C(60) (DMA C(60)) on cytoplasmic membrane, intracellular calcium concentration ([Ca(2+)](i)), and mitochondrial membrane in HeLa cells were studied by using laser scanning confocal microscopy together with fluorescent(More)
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer. — Department of Economics — University of Bonn — D-53113 Bonn, Phone: +49(0228)739220 — Fax: +49(0228)739221 *University of Bonn, Department of Economics, BWL II, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, Email: ding@uni-bonn.de **Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, School of Economics, Guoding Road 777, 200433(More)
This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the auction the winning bid is made public. Bidders may signal(More)
1 We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their inspiring comments. Abstract We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits(More)
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