Cuihong Fan

Learn More
RING finger proteins play important roles in spermatogenesis. Here, we report that a novel RING finger protein RNF151, with a C3HC4-type RING finger domain, a putative nuclear localization signal (NLS), and a TRAF-type zinc finger domain, was exclusively expressed in the mouse testis and developmentally regulated during spermatogenesis. While RNF151 mRNA(More)
Inhibin has long been considered as a suppresser of follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) secretion from anterior pituitary through pituitary-gonad negative feedback to regulate follicle development. We demonstrated that addition of inhibin A could significantly suppress FSH-induced FSHR mRNA level in cultured rat granulosa cells (GCs) measured by real-time(More)
The biological activities of fullerene derivatives have attracted much attention in the last decade. In this paper, effects of dimalonic acid C(60) (DMA C(60)) on cytoplasmic membrane, intracellular calcium concentration ([Ca(2+)](i)), and mitochondrial membrane in HeLa cells were studied by using laser scanning confocal microscopy together with fluorescent(More)
This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the auction the winning bid is made public. Bidders may signal(More)
We reconsider the justifications of the R&D subsidies of Spencer and Brander (1983), by allowing firms to form a research joint venture (RJV) and license innovations. If governments offer unconditional subsidies, an RJV is formed and the strategic benefits of R&D subsidies vanish. Nevertheless, governments subsidize their domestic firms to enhance their(More)
We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlist-ing is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore whether the procurer should reimburse the nonrecoverable cost of preparing a bid in whole or in part. We find that a(More)
R&D rivalry and optimal R&D policies are investigated in an asymmetric four-stage game that involves international licensing. It is found that a government's R&D policy crucially depends on its domestic firm's bargaining power over the licensing gain. When the firm's bargaining power is greater than one half, the government subsidizes its home firm's R&D(More)
1 We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their inspiring comments. Abstract We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits(More)
  • 1