Cuihong Fan

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Inhibin has long been considered as a suppresser of follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) secretion from anterior pituitary through pituitary-gonad negative feedback to regulate follicle development. We demonstrated that addition of inhibin A could significantly suppress FSH-induced FSHR mRNA level in cultured rat granulosa cells (GCs) measured by real-time(More)
This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the auction the winning bid is made public. Bidders may signal(More)
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that awards a limited number of fixed-fee licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firms' messages are dual signals: the message of those who win a fixed-fee license signals their cost reduction to rival firms, whereas losers' message(More)
We reconsider the justifications of the R&D subsidies of Spencer and Brander (1983), by allowing firms to form a research joint venture (RJV) and license innovations. If governments offer unconditional subsidies, an RJV is formed and the strategic benefits of R&D subsidies vanish. Nevertheless, governments subsidize their domestic firms to enhance their(More)
  • Urs Schweizer, Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter, Byoung Heon, Jun +1 other
  • 2010
This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the auction the winning bid is made public. Bidders may signal(More)
1 We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their inspiring comments. Abstract We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits(More)
  • Cuihong Fan, Zhentang Zhang, Internationale Lizenzierungen, F&e Beihilfen
  • 2002
R&D rivalry and optimal R&D policies are investigated in an asymmetric four-stage game that involves international licensing. It is found that a government's R&D policy crucially depends on its domestic firm's bargaining power over the licensing gain. When the firm's bargaining power is greater than one half, the government subsidizes its home firm's R&D(More)
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