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Distance-Bounding identification protocols aim at impeding man-in-the-middle attacks by measuring response times. There are three kinds of attacks such protocols could address: (1) Mafia attacks where the adversary relays communication between honest prover and honest verifier in different sessions; (2) Terrorist attacks where the adversary gets limited(More)
Kundu and Bertino (VLDB 2008) recently introduced the idea of structural signatures for trees which support public redaction of subtrees (by third-party distributors) while pertaining the integrity of the remaining parts. An example is given by signed XML documents of which parts should be sanitized before being published by a distributor not holding the(More)
SSL/TLS is one of the most widely deployed cryptographic protocols on the Internet. It is used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted data in various client-server applications. The currently specified version is TLS 1.2, and its security has been analyzed extensively in the cryptographic literature. The IETF working group is actively(More)
In distance-bounding protocols, verifiers use a clock to measure the time elapsed in challenge-response rounds, thus upper-bounding their distance to the prover. This should prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) relay attacks. Distance-bounding protocols may aim to prevent several attacks, amongst which terrorist fraud, where a dishonest prover helps the(More)
We propose a new distance bounding protocol, which builds upon the private RFID authentication protocol by Peeters and Hermans [25]. In contrast to most distance-bounding protocols in literature, our construction is based on public-key cryptography. Public-key cryptography (specifically Elliptic Curve Cryptography) can, contrary to popular belief, be(More)
Distance-bounding protocols prevent man-in-the-middle attacks by measuring response times. The four attacks such protocols typically address, recently formalized in [10], are: (1) mafia fraud, where the adversary must impersonate to a verifier in the presence of an honest prover; (2) terrorist fraud, where the adversary gets some offline prover support to(More)
—At ACM CCS 2008, Rasmussen andČapkun introduced a distance-bounding protocol [22] (henceforth R ˇ C protocol) where the prover and verifier use simultaneous transmissions and the verifier counts the delay between sending a challenge (starting with a hidden marker) and receiving the response. Thus, the verifier is able to compute an upper bound on the(More)
In distance-bounding authentication protocols, a verifier assesses that a prover is (1) legitimate and (2) in the verifier's proximity. Proximity checking is done by running time-critical exchanges between both parties. This enables the verifier to detect relay attacks (also called mafia fraud). While most distance-bounding protocols offer resistance to(More)
In many cases, we can only have access to a service by proving we are sufficiently close to a particular location (e.g., in automobile or building access control). In these cases, proximity can be guaranteed through signal at-tenuation. However, by using additional transmitters an attacker can relay signals between the prover and the verifier.(More)