Constantinos Syropoulos

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In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in ``guns'') that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set. In such settings, with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set, it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in terms of efficiency. We(More)
Sovereign states arm to defend real or hypothetical interests, presumably because they cannot engage in complete, long-term contracting that would prevent such arming. International trade, therefore, takes place within an essentially anarchic context, and we can expect trade regimes and security policies to be related. Indeed, many embargoes, sanctions, and(More)
We construct a three-country model to determine how the formation of free trade areas (FTAs) affects optimal tariffs and welfare. We find that, at constant rest of the world (ROW) tariffs, the adoption of internal free trade induces union members to reduce their external tariffs below the Kemp–Wan [J. Int. Econom. 6 (1976) 95–97] level, and causes ROW’s(More)
This paper examines the impact of reciprocal trade liberalization on collusive conduct between domestic and foreign firms interacting in several markets. In our benchmark model, which deals with a symmetric homogenous-goods oligopoly, we show that in the absence of trade barriers an efficient collusive agreement involves equal division of the market in each(More)
B.1 Restricted (free) trade In this appendix we consider the implications of a restricted trade regime. That is to say, we suppose that groups cannot procure arms in global markets when Li < GT , even when they can trade in both butter and oil. Under the maintained assumption that endowments are identically distributed, imposing this restriction implies(More)
The paper develops a dynamic model of scale-invariant global Schumpeterian (R&Dbased) growth, North-South trade, and international patent protection. Intellectual property protection takes the form of finite-length and perfectly enforceable global patents awarded to Northern firms that discover new higher-quality products. The model generates product-cycle(More)
B.1 Elasticity Estimates: Robustness Checks We perform series of experiments in order to check the robustness of our elasticity estimates from Table 1 of the main text. Table B.1 reports our findings. To obtain the estimates in the first row of the table, Hours of Work, we use relative labor demand and relative wages calculated on the basis of hours spent(More)
We examine how globalization affects trade patterns and welfare when conflict prevails domestically. We do so in a simple model of trade, in which a natural resource like oil is contested by competing groups using real resources (“guns”). Thus, conflict is viewed as ultimately stemming from imperfect property-rights enforcement. When comparing autarky with(More)
We augment the canonical neoclassical model of trade to allow for interstate disputes over land, oil, water, or other resources. The costs of such disputes in terms of arming depend on the trade regime in place. Under either autarky or free trade, the larger country (in terms of factor endowments) need not to be more powerful. Yet, under free trade, there(More)