Constantinos Syropoulos

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In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in``guns'') that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set. In such settings, with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set, it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in terms of efficiency. We(More)
We construct a three-country model to determine how the formation of free trade areas (FTAs) affects optimal tariffs and welfare. We find that, at constant rest of the world (ROW) tariffs, the adoption of internal free trade induces union members to reduce their external tariffs below the Kemp – Wan [J. Int. Econom. 6 (1976) 95 – 97] level, and causes ROW's(More)
Sovereign states arm to defend real or hypothetical interests, presumably because they cannot engage in complete, long-term contracting that would prevent such arming. International trade, therefore, takes place within an essentially anarchic context, and we can expect trade regimes and security policies to be related. Indeed , many embargoes, sanctions,(More)
We examine how globalization affects trade patterns and welfare when conflict prevails domestically. We do so in a simple model of trade, in which a natural resource like oil is contested by competing groups using real resources (" guns "). Thus, conflict is viewed as ultimately stemming from imperfect property-rights enforcement. When comparing autarky(More)
This paper examines the impact of reciprocal trade liberalization on collusive conduct between domestic and foreign firms interacting in several markets. In our benchmark model, which deals with a symmetric homogenous-goods oligopoly, we show that in the absence of trade barriers an efficient collusive agreement involves equal division of the market in each(More)
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