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- Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W. Goldberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou
- Commun. ACM
- 2005

We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recently-established equivalence between polynomial time solvability of normal form games and graphical games, establishing that… (More)

- Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, Christos H. Papadimitriou
- Theor. Comput. Sci.
- 2006

In view of the intractability of finding a Nash equilibrium, it is important to understand the limits of approximation in this context. A subexponential approximation scheme is known [LMM03], and no approximation better than 1 4 is possible by any algorithm that examines equilibria involving fewer than logn strategies [Alt94]. We give a simple, linear-time… (More)

- Sanjeev Arora, Constantinos Daskalakis, David Steurer
- IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
- 2009

Linear programming decoding for low-density parity check codes (and related domains such as compressed sensing) has received increased attention over recent years because of its practical performance --coming close to that of iterative decoding algorithms--- and its amenability to finite-blocklength analysis. Several works starting with the work of Feldman… (More)

- Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou
- Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity
- 2005

We prove that computing a Nash equilibrium in a 3-player game is PPAD-complete, solving a problem left open in (2).

If a class of games is known to have a Nash equilibrium with probability values that are either zero or Ω(1) -- and thus with support of bounded size -- then obviously this equilibrium can be found exhaustively in polynomial time. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that there is a PTAS for the class of games whose equilibria are guaranteed to have… (More)

Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [Cai et al. 2012b, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting, e.g. when the bidders have additive valuations with independent and/or continuous values for the… (More)

- Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis
- 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of…
- 2011

We provide a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme for the multi-dimensional unit-demand pricing problem, when the buyer's values are independent (but not necessarily identically distributed.) For all epsilon>0, we obtain a (1+epsilon)-factor approximation to the optimal revenue in time polynomial, when the values are sampled from Monotone Hazard Rate… (More)

We provide a duality-based framework for revenue maximization in a multiple-good monopoly. Our framework shows that every optimal mechanism has a certificate of optimality, taking the form of an optimal transportation map between measures. Using our framework, we prove that grand-bundling mechanisms are optimal if and only if two stochastic dominance… (More)

- Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, Seth M Weinberg
- 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of…
- 2012

We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in multidimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary - possibly combinatorial - feasibility constraints and independent bidders with arbitrary - possibly combinatorial-demand constraints, appropriately extending Myerson's single-dimensional result [21] to this setting. We also show… (More)

- Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou
- 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of…
- 2007

We present efficient approximation algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in anonymous games, that is, games in which the players utilities, though different, do not differentiate between other players. Our results pertain to such games with many players but few strategies. We show that any such game has an approximate pure Nash equilibrium, computable in… (More)