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This paper defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason problem. I argue for the skeptical view that putative reasons of the wrong kind are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes but not reasons for those attitudes. The argument turns on the transmission of reasons: the familiar fact that there is often reason for(More)
When we deliberate about what to believe, considerations relevant to what is true play a special role in motivating us to believe or not believe one thing or another. This special role should be understood, according to Nishi Shah, in terms of the phenomenon of transparency. Shah takes transparency as the base of an inference to the best explanation, whose(More)
It is widely held that when you are deliberating about whether to believe some proposition p, only considerations relevant to the truth of p can be taken into account as reasons bearing on whether to believe p and motivate you accordingly. This thesis of exclusivity has significance for debates about the nature of belief, about control of belief, and about(More)
In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its(More)
In this paper I discuss Pascal Engel's recent work on doxastic correctness. I raise worries about two elements of his view-the role played in it by the distinction between i-correctness and e-correctness, and the construal of doxastic correctness as an ideal of reason. I propose an alternative approach. It is a great privilege to contribute to this(More)
According to the fitting-attitudes account of value, for X to be good is for it to be fitting to value X. But what is it for an attitude to be fitting? A popular recent view is that it is for there to be sufficient reason for the attitude. In this paper we argue that proponents of the fitting-attitudes account should reject this view and instead take(More)
A normative reason for a person to φ is a consideration which favours φing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person φs. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons (not) to φ for or on the basis of certain(More)