Claude Crampes

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The question addressed by the paper is whether standard procedures and widely accepted insights of competition policy remain valid when one deals with potentially anti-competitive conduct in innovative industries. The question of appropriateness arises because competition in these industries displays features that are radically different from those(More)
Several studies have compared the efficiency of publicly and privately owned water utilities and reached conflicting conclusions on the impact of ownership on efficiency. This article provides further evidence by estimating a stochastic cost frontier for a sample of Asian and Pacific regional water companies. The results show that efficiency is not(More)
  • Theon van Dijk, Patrick Van Cayseele, +4 authors Eric de Laat
  • 1996
The stringency of novelty requirements that patent offices and courts use in judging infringement issues and patentability of inventions defines the height of protection provided to a patentholder. In this paper the effects of patent height are studied in a duopoly where firms compete in product improvements. Minimal steps of improvements, determined by the(More)
We analyze a two-stage game where capacity constrained electricity generators first choose how much capacity they make available and then compete in a uniform price auction. We study how capacity withholding can be used strategically to enforce market power and how uniform auctions in the price game change the results of capacity constrained competition(More)
In Europe and in Japan, patent applications are publicly disclosed after 18 month from the filing date regardless of whether a patent has been or will be registered. In the U.S. in contrast, patent applications are publicly disclosed only when a patent is granted. In this paper we examine the consequences of this difference for (i) firm's R&D and patenting(More)
The paper asks how a for-profit cable or satellite operator allocates a fixed channel capacity to different program types and how the different channels are bundled and priced. It also addresses the question how channel allocation and bundling decisions made by a for-profit firm differ from the decisions a welfare-maximizing firm would make. It also(More)
We analyze the effects of piracy on the pricing policy of a software publisher. Contrary to the existing literature, we focus on the consequences of cost randomness in the decision to use illegal packages of software and on the risk aversion of users and we characterize the optimal prices both under symmetric and asymmetric information. It clearly appears(More)