Clara Ponsati

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We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q ≥ 2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all singlepeak, strictly quasi-concave and(More)
Why is issue-by-issue bargaining a common phenomenon, even though it disallows the beneficial trade-offs across issues that are possible when negotiating a global solution? We show that under asymmetric information, issue-by-issue bargaining has two attractive features. First, it avoids bundling a good deal on one issue with a bad deal on another issue,(More)
Global bargaining problems over a finite number of different issues are formalized as cartesian products of classical bargaining problems. For maximin and leximin bargainers we characterize global bargaining solutions that are efficient and satisfy the requirement that bargaining separately or globally leads to equivalent outcomes. Global solutions in this(More)
The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved in the confrontation (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, models addressing negotiations in such situations ought to account for the role and(More)
We consider negotiations where one of the parties is a group that must send a representative to the bargaining table. We examine the trade-offs that the group faces in choosing between two different regimes for this representation: (i)Delegationwhere the representative is granted full authority to reach an agreement, and (ii) Ratification, where any(More)
Egalitarianism and meritocracy are competing principles to distribute the joint bene…ts of cooperation. We examine the consequences of letting members of society vote between those two principles, in a context where groups of a certain size must be formed in order for individuals to become productive. Our setup induces a hedonic game of coalition formation.(More)
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders that features three of the main rationalist explanations for armed conflicts: uncertainty, commitment, and indivisibility. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining, where offers are made, with claim stages, where one side can commit to impose surrender on(More)
We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, that enjoys benefits upon a bilateral agreement. To address the strategic implications of stakeholders over negotiations, we consider a model where two bargainers interact in the presence of a third party that (a) can transfer a share of her benefits to the bargainers(More)