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We study a fair division problem, where a set of indivisible goods is to be allocated to a set of n agents. Each agent may have different preferences, represented by a valuation function that is a probability distribution on the set of goods. In the continuous case, where goods are infinitely divisible, it is well known that proportional allocations always… (More)

Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been considered either when the bidder values are i.i.d, or when each bidder is individually identifiable via her value distribution. The latter is a reasonable approach when the bidders can be classified into a few categories, but there are many instances where the classification of bidders is… (More)

We present a model for fair strategyproof allocations in a realistic model of cloud computing centers. This model has the standard Leontief preferences but also captures a key property of virtualization, the use of containers to isolate jobs. We first present several impossibility results for deterministic mechanisms in this setting. We then construct an… (More)

In this paper we present an analysis of dynamic fair division of a divisible resource, with arrivals and departures of agents. Our key requirement is that we wish to disrupt the allocation of at most a small number of existing agents whenever a new agent arrives. We construct optimal recursive mechanisms to compute the allocations and provide tight analytic… (More)

We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent’s joint distribution of valuations for the two items is known, and the agent knows the valuation for the current item (but not for the one in the future). The designer… (More)

We study a pricing problem that is motivated by the following examples. A cloud computing platform such as Amazon EC2 sells virtual machines to clients, each of who needs a different number of virtual machine hours. Similarly, cloud storage providers such as Dropbox have customers that require different amounts of storage. Software companies such as… (More)

In the single-resource dynamic fair division framework there is a homogeneous resource that is shared between agents dynamically arriving and departing over time. When <i>n</i> agents are present, there is only one truly ``fair'' allocation: each agent receives 1/<i>n</i> of the resource. Implementing this static solution in the dynamic world is notoriously… (More)

- Siqi Liu, Christos-Alexandros Psomas
- ArXiv
- 2017

The Competition Complexity of an auction measures how much competition is needed for the revenue of a simple auction to surpass the optimal revenue. A classic result from auction theory by Bulow and Klemperer [9], states that the Competition Complexity of VCG, in the case of n i.i.d. buyers and a single item, is 1, i.e., it is better to recruit one extra… (More)

Algorithmic Mechanism Design in Dynamic Environments by Christos Alexandros Psomas Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Christos H. Papadimitriou, Chair Over the past two decades, a new field has emerged between Computer Science and Game Theory: Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Despite tremendous growth and… (More)

- Sergios Petridis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas
- 2012 IEEE 24th International Conference on Tools…
- 2012

This paper presents a probabilistic extension of Allen's relations that enables reasoning with intervals whose boundaries are uncertain. Building on an earlier work on an hourglass model that depicts the geometry of interval relations, we first provide further evidence that support its qualitative properties. We then specify two orthogonal axes, which… (More)