Christos A. Ioannou

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We propose a methodology that is generalizable to a broad class of repeated games in order to facilitate operability of belief learning models with repeated-game strategies. The methodology consists of (1) a generalized repeated-game strategy space, (2) a mapping between histories and repeated-game beliefs, and (3) asynchronous updating of repeated-game(More)
— A genetic algorithm is used to simulate the evolution of Moore machines in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma stage-game. The machines are prone to two types of errors: (a) implementation errors and (b) perception errors. We conduct computational experiments that incorporate different levels of errors in an effort to assess whether and how the distribution(More)
We use a genetic algorithm to simulate the evolution of error-prone finite automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. In particular, the automata are subjected to implementation and perception errors. The computational experiments examine whether and how the distribution of outcomes and genotypes of the coevolved automata change with different levels(More)
We study experimentally the effect on individual behavior of comparative, but payoff-irrelevant, information in a near-minimal group setting. Specifically, in each round, group members see the groups' cumulative payoffs, which consist of an aggrega-tion of the earnings of each member of the group in the round. Our novel experimental design incorporates two(More)
We examine the asymptotic behavior of a finite, but error-prone population, whose agents can choose one of ALLD (always defect), ALLC (always cooperate), or Pavlov (repeats the previous action if the opponent cooperated and changes action otherwise) to play the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. A novelty of the study is that it allows for three types of errors(More)
Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium inde-terminacy in Coordination games. The former assume that agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals to capture disperse information, whereas the latter model the number of actual players as a Poisson random variable to capture population uncertainty in large(More)
An (A) expected (strong) bubble is said to exist if it is mutual knowledge that the price of the asset is higher than the expected (possible) dividend. By requiring common knowledge instead of mutual knowledge, the new concept of common expected bubble (common strong bubble) is developed. In a simple …nite horizon model with asymmetric information and short(More)
Understanding how individuals discount and evaluate the risks of environmental outcomes is a prime component in designing effective environmental policy. We use an incentivized experimental design to investigate whether subjects' time preferences and risk aversion across the monetary and environmental domains differ. We find that subjects' time preferences(More)
Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Coordination games. They model the number of actual players as a Poisson random variable to capture population uncertainty in large games. Two natural questions are (a) whether uncertainty about the number of actual players does have an impact on subjects' behavior, and if so (b)(More)