Christopher S. Cotton

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We develop a game-theoretic model of lobbying in which contributions buy access to politicians. The analysis considers the claim that the rich are better off because they have more access to politicians, and that contribution limits reduce the rich-interest advantage, resulting in less-skewed policy. We show that these arguments do not hold when the(More)
Skin has the potential to provide an important noninvasive route for diagnostic monitoring of human subjects for a wide range of applications. Dimensions of surface features in skin suggest that nanodevices and microdevices could be utilized to monitor molecules and ions extracted from the skin. Methods of enhancing extraction from the skin for diagnostics(More)
This paper develops a model of political contributions in which a politician can either sell policy favors, or sell access. Access allows interest groups to share hard information with the politician in support of their preferred policy. Here selling access maximizes policy utility, while selling policy favors maximizes total contributions. Imposing a(More)
In this online section, we consider an information structure in which both article quality and author signals are continuously distributed. The structure is identical to the one presented in Leslie (2005). This section, therefore, illustrates how the main result in the paper—that journal quality is maximized through a combination of both fees and delays(More)
Past research finds that males outperform females in competitive situations. Using data from multiple-round math tournaments, we verify this finding during the initial round of competition. The performance gap between males and females, however, disappears after the first round. In later rounds, only math ability (not gender) serves as a significant(More)
High-School human capital investment occurs within a competitive environment, and Affirmative Action (AA) shapes the relative competition between blacks and whites for admission to high-quality colleges. We present a theory of AA in university admissions and conduct a field experiment to mimic aspects of competition for college. We offer relative incentives(More)
Proof to Proposition 1. We first show that, when players care enough about future rounds, exclusion of a player from future coalitions is a credible threat, sustainable as part of a SPE. Let Z denote an arbitrary subgame of one of our games. We say that player i is “excluded in subgame Z” if in every period t along the path of play of the subgame, xt i = 0.(More)