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We present algorithms for a class of resource allocation problems both in the online setting with stochastic input and in the offline setting. This class of problems contains many interesting special cases such as the Adwords problem. In the online setting we introduce a new distributional model called the adversarial stochastic input model, which is a… (More)

Truthfulness is fragile and demanding. It is oftentimes harder to guarantee truthfulness when solving a problem than it is to solve the problem itself. Even worse, truthfulness can be utterly destroyed by small uncertainties in a mechanism’s outcome. One obstacle is that truthful payments depend on outcomes other than the one realized, such as the… (More)

The first-price auction is popular in practice for its simplicity and transparency. Moreover, its potential virtues grow in complex settings where incentive compatible auctions may generate little or no revenue. Unfortunately, the first-price auction is poorly understood in theory because equilibrium is not <i>a priori</i> a credible predictor of bidder… (More)

A single advertisement often benefits many parties, for example, an ad for a Samsung laptop benefits Microsoft. We study this phenomenon in search advertising auctions and show that standard solutions, including the status quo ignorance of mutual benefit and a benefit-aware Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, perform poorly. In contrast, we show that an… (More)

The convexity assumptions required for the Arrow-Debreu theorem are reasonable and realistic for preferences; however, they are highly problematic for production because they rule out economies of scale. We take a complexity-theoretic look at economies with non-convex production. It is known that in such markets equilibrium prices may not exist; we show… (More)

We study the optimal mechanism design problem faced by a market intermediary who makes revenue by connecting buyers and sellers. We first show that the optimal intermediation protocol has substantial structure: it is the solution to an algorithmic pricing problem in which seller's costs are replaced with virtual costs, and the sellers' payments need only… (More)

Bidders often want to get as much as they can without violating constraints on what they spend. For example , advertisers seek to maximize the impressions, clicks, sales, or market share generated by their advertising , subject to budget or return-on-investment (ROI) constraints. Likewise, when bidders have no direct utility for leftover money – e.g.,… (More)

The popular generalized second price (GSP) auction for sponsored search is built upon a separable model of click-through-rates that decomposes the likelihood of a click into the product of a " slot effect " and an " advertiser effect " —if the first slot is twice as good as the second for some bidder, then it is twice as good for everyone. Though appealing… (More)

We show a range of complexity results for the Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin models of international trade (as Arrow-Debreu production markets). For both models, we show three types of results: 1. When utility functions are Leontief and production functions are linear, it is NP-hard to decide if a market has an equilibrium. 2. When utility functions and… (More)