We examine how the speed of learning and best-response processes depends on homophily: the tendency of agents to associate disproportionately with those having similar traits. When agents' beliefs or behaviors are developed by averaging what they see among their neighbors, then convergence to a consensus is slowed by the presence of homophily, but is not… (More)
Founded in 1963 by two prominent Austrians living in exile – the sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the economist Oskar Morgenstern – with the financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education and the City of Vienna, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) is the first institution for postgraduate education and research… (More)
the editors and referees for their extremely valuable suggestions on both the contents and exposition of the paper. 5 The genesis of this paper is as follows. Huang (2000a, 2000b) had first obtained most of the results in this paper. Working independently, Hara and Kuzmics established similar results in a series of manuscripts since December 2001. These… (More)
Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) investigate a stochastic evolutionary model for extensive form games and show that even for games of perfect information with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, non-subgame perfect equilibrium-strategies may well survive in the long run even when mutation rates tend to zero. In a different model of evolution in the agent… (More)
We study a natural (and, in a well-defined sense, minimal) refinement of the best-reply correspondence. Its fixed points, notions of rationalizability and CURB sets based on this correspondence are defined and characterized. Finally minimally asymptotically stable faces under the induced refined best-reply dynamics are characterized.
We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of alternative symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are… (More)
Generic extensive form games of perfect information have a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium. Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) show that in a stochastic evolutionary model also non-subgame perfect equilibrium-strategies may well survive in the long run. In a different model of evolution in the agent normal form of generic extensive form games of perfect… (More)
for helpful comments and suggestions. Abstract A population of individuals is divided into groups. Individuals are recurrently randomly matched with individuals from their group to play a generic symmetric 2-player game. Deterministic inter-and intra-group dynamics are derived from a model of individual imitation within groups and individual migration… (More)