Christoph Kuzmics

Learn More
We examine how the speed of learning and best-response processes depends on homophily: the tendency of agents to associate disproportionately with those having similar traits. When agents’ beliefs or behaviors are developed by averaging what they see among their neighbors, then convergence to a consensus is slowed by the presence of homophily, but is not(More)
This paper provides a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of alternative symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal(More)
The empirical joint distribution of return-pairs on stock indices displays high tail-dependence in the lower tail and low tail-dependence in the upper tail. The presence of tail-dependence is not compatible with the assumption of (conditional) joint normality. The presence of asymmetric-tail dependence is not compatible with the assumption of a joint(More)
Since campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to ‘buy favors’, this paper assumes that contributions influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest groups achieve influence by providing political decision makers with(More)
We consider fundamental questions of arbitrage pricing arising when the uncertainty model incorporates volatility uncertainty. The resulting ambiguity motivates a new principle of preference-free valuation. By establishing a microeconomic foundation of sublinear price systems, the principle of ambiguity-neutral valuation imposes the novel concept of(More)
This paper analyzes a stochastic best reply evolutionary model with inertia in normal form games. The long-run behavior of individuals in this model is investigated in the limit where experimentation rates tend to zero, while the expected number of experimenters, and hence also population sizes, tend to infinity. Conditions on the learning-rate which are(More)
We study the representative consumer’s risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a singleperiod, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tolerance, so must the representative consumer. We also identify a relationship(More)