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We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary(More)
To explain the evolution of cooperation by natural selection has been a major goal of biologists since Darwin. Cooperators help others at a cost to themselves, while defectors receive the benefits of altruism without providing any help in return. The standard game dynamical formulation is the 'Prisoner's Dilemma', in which two players have a choice between(More)
In this paper, we show that for evolutionary dynamics between two types that can be described by a Moran process, the conditional fixation time of either type is the same irrespective of the selective scenario. With frequency dependent selection between two strategies A and B of an evolutionary game, regardless of whether A dominates B, A and B are best(More)
This paper proposes and analyzes a model of stochastic evolution in finite populations. The expected motion in our model resembles the standard replicator dynamic when the population is large, but is qualitatively different when the population size is small, due to the difference between maximizing payoff and maximizing relative payoff. Moreover, even in(More)
The aim of this exploratory study was to investigate the influences of adult behaviors on child coping behaviors during venipunctures (VPs) in an emergency department. Observations of children and adults from 66 VPs were coded using a modified version of the Child-Adult Medical Procedure Interaction Scale and analyzed using sequential analysis. Results(More)
We study stochastic game dynamics in finite populations. To this end we extend the classical Moran process to incorporate frequency-dependent selection and mutation. For 2 x 2 games, we give a complete analysis of the long-run behavior when mutation rates are small. For 3 x 3 coordination games, we provide a simple rule to determine which strategy will be(More)
The classical setting of evolutionary game theory, the replicator equation, assumes uniform interaction rates. The rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. Here we extend this framework by allowing the interaction rates to depend on the strategies. This extension leads to non-linear fitness functions. We show that a(More)
Modern large-scale infrastructure systems are typically complicated in nature and require extensive simulations to evaluate their performance. The Probabilistic Collocation Method (PCM) is developed to simulate system performance under uncertainty. In particular, it allows using a limited number of simulations to produce a reduced-order representation of(More)
1 Abstract Traditionally, the design of a transportation system has focused on either vehicle design or the network flow, assuming the other as given. However, to define a system level architecture for a transportation system, it is advantageous to expand the system boundary during the design process to include the network routing, the vehicle(More)