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- Christian W. Bach, Andrés Perea
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2014

In game theory, basic solution concepts often conflict with experimental findings or intuitive reasoning. This fact is possibly due to the requirement that zero probability be assigned to irrational choices in these concepts. Here, we introduce the epistemic notion of common belief in utility proportional beliefs which also assigns positive probability to… (More)

- Christian W. Bach, Conrad Heilmann
- IGTR
- 2011

We analyze the sequential structure of dynamic games with perfect information. A three-stage account is proposed, that specifies setup , reasoning and play stages. Accordingly, we define a player as a set of agents corresponding to these three stages. The notion of agent con-nectedness is introduced into a type-based epistemic model. Agent con-nectedness… (More)

- Christian W. Bach, Jérémie Cabessa
- TARK
- 2009

Epistemic game theory scrutinizes the relationship between knowledge, belief and choice of rational players. Here, the relationship between common knowledge and the limit of higher-order mutual knowledge is studied from a topological point of view. More precisely, the new epistemic operator limit knowledge defined as the topological limit of higher-order… (More)

- Christian W. Bach, Elias Tsakas
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2014

- Christian W. Bach, Jérémie Cabessa
- LORI
- 2011

The possibility for agents to agree to disagree is considered in an extended epistemic-topological framework. In such an enriched context , Aumann's impossibility theorem is shown to no longer hold. More precisely, agents with a common prior belief satisfying limit knowledge instead of common knowledge of their posterior beliefs may actually entertain… (More)

- Christian W. Bach, Andrés Perea
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- 2013

The robustness of Aumann's seminal agreement theorem with respect to the common prior assumption is considered. More precisely, we show by means of an example that two Bayesian agents with almost identical prior beliefs can agree to completely disagree on their posterior beliefs. Secondly, a more detailed agent model is introduced where posterior beliefs… (More)

We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epis-temic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), but also the subsequent… (More)

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