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In game theory, basic solution concepts often conflict with experimental findings or intuitive reasoning. This fact is possibly due to the requirement that zero probability be assigned to irrational choices in these concepts. Here, we introduce the epistemic notion of common belief in utility proportional beliefs which also assigns positive probability to… (More)

Epistemic game theory scrutinizes the relationship between knowledge, belief and choice of rational players. Here, the relationship between common knowledge and the limit of higher-order mutual knowledge is studied from a topological point of view. More precisely, the new epistemic operator limit knowledge defined as the topological limit of higher-order… (More)

We analyze the sequential structure of dynamic games with perfect information. A three-stage account is proposed, that specifies setup , reasoning and play stages. Accordingly, we define a player as a set of agents corresponding to these three stages. The notion of agent con-nectedness is introduced into a type-based epistemic model. Agent con-nectedness… (More)

The possibility for agents to agree to disagree is considered in an extended epistemic-topological framework. In such an enriched context , Aumann's impossibility theorem is shown to no longer hold. More precisely, agents with a common prior belief satisfying limit knowledge instead of common knowledge of their posterior beliefs may actually entertain… (More)

The robustness of Aumann's seminal agreement theorem with respect to the common prior assumption is considered. More precisely, we show by means of an example that two Bayesian agents with almost identical prior beliefs can agree to completely disagree on their posterior beliefs. Secondly, a more detailed agent model is introduced where posterior beliefs… (More)

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