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We document the widespread existence of antisocial punishment, that is, the sanctioning of people who behave prosocially. Our evidence comes from public goods experiments that we conducted in 16 comparable participant pools around the world. However, there is a huge cross-societal variation. Some participant pools punished the high contributors as much as(More)
Many people contribute to public goods but stop doing so once they experience free riding. We test the hypothesis that groups whose members know that they are composed only of " like-minded " cooperators are able to maintain a higher cooperation level than the most cooperative, randomly composed groups. Our experiments confirm this hypothesis. We also(More)
We report survey and experimental evidence on trust and voluntary cooperation from more than 630 non-student and student participants in rural and urban Russia. Our subjects have a diverse socioeconomic background that we relate to the answers of a survey on trust attitudes and to contribution behavior in a one-shot public goods game. We find that the(More)
We replicate the strategy-method experiment by Fischbacher et al. (Econ. Lett. 71:397–404, 2001) developed to measure attitudes towards cooperation in a one-shot public goods game. We collected data from 160 students at four different universities across urban and rural Russia. Using the classification proposed by Fischbacher et al. (2001) we find that the(More)
"Winner-Take-All"-markets, i.e. markets in which the relative and not the absolute performance is decisive, have gained in importance. Such markets have a tendency to provoke inefficiently many entries. We investigate the functioning of such markets with the help of experiments and show that there are even more inefficient entries than predicted by the Nash(More)
  • Simon Gächter, Christian Thöni, Sergei Zorya, Lena Gerasimenko, Michael Belaev, Jevgenji Maslukov +2 others
  • 2003
Two economically important elements of social capital are trust and disciplining free-riders. Most of current research focuses on trust. We argue that research should shift focus toward informal sanctions. We present two experimental studies from Switzerland, Byelorussia and Russia to support this argument. Our first study elicits trust and cooperative(More)
Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper, we provide an answer by analysing the data of Herrmann et al. (2008a), who studied cooperation and punishment in 16 subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (2000)).(More)
"Winner-Take-All"-markets, i.e. markets in which the relative and not the absolute performance is decisive, have gained in importance. Such markets have a tendency to provoke inefficiently many entries. We investigate the functioning of such markets with the help of experiments and show that there are even more inefficient entries than predicted by the Nash(More)
  • Simon Gächter, Christian Thöni, George Akerlof, Daniele Nosenzo, Therese Fässler, Martin
  • 2010
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science,(More)