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We document the widespread existence of antisocial punishment, that is, the sanctioning of people who behave prosocially. Our evidence comes from public goods experiments that we conducted in 16 comparable participant pools around the world. However, there is a huge cross-societal variation. Some participant pools punished the high contributors as much as(More)
Many people contribute to public goods but stop doing so once they experience free riding. We test the hypothesis that groups whose members know that they are composed only of " like-minded " cooperators are able to maintain a higher cooperation level than the most cooperative, randomly composed groups. Our experiments confirm this hypothesis. We also(More)
The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision‐making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non‐cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game(More)
Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper, we provide an answer by analysing the data of Herrmann et al. (2008a), who studied cooperation and punishment in 16 subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (2000)).(More)
We replicate the strategy-method experiment by Fischbacher et al. (Econ. Lett. 71:397–404, 2001) developed to measure attitudes towards cooperation in a one-shot public goods game. We collected data from 160 students at four different universities across urban and rural Russia. Using the classification proposed by Fischbacher et al. (2001) we find that the(More)
"Winner-Take-All"-markets, i.e. markets in which the relative and not the absolute performance is decisive, have gained in importance. Such markets have a tendency to provoke inefficiently many entries. We investigate the functioning of such markets with the help of experiments and show that there are even more inefficient entries than predicted by the Nash(More)
Two economically important elements of social capital are trust and disciplining free-riders. Most of current research focuses on trust. We argue that research should shift focus toward informal sanctions. We present two experimental studies from Switzerland, Byelorussia and Russia to support this argument. Our first study elicits trust and cooperative(More)
Social preferences and social influence effects (''peer effects'') are well documented, but little is known about how peers shape social preferences. Settings where social preferences matter are often situations where peer effects are likely too. In a gift-exchange experiment with independent payoffs between two agents we find causal evidence for peer(More)