Chloe Tergiman

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a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjects' beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subject's true cognitive level(More)
There is growing evidence that not all experimental subjects understand their strategic environment. We introduce a ''choice process'' (CP) protocol that aids in identifying these subjects. This protocol elicits in an incentive compatible manner provisional choices as players internalize their decision making environment. We implement the CP protocol in the(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to – and do – engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to(More)
When the performances of agents are correlated (because of a common random component) contracts that use information on both the relative and absolute performance of agents theoretically outperform rank-order tournaments and piece-rate schemes. Although the theoretical advantage of such contracts has long been noticed in the literature, the empirical papers(More)
We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates' ideologies from observing candidates' campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candi-dates' types depends on the visibility(More)
We introduce a new experimental design to provide insight into strategic choice in one shot games. We incentivize and observe provisional choices in the 2/3 guessing game in the period after the structure of the game has been communicated. We define as naive those who play dominated strategies well after we have communicated the structure of the game. We(More)
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