Chloe Tergiman

Learn More
a Center for Experimental Social Sciences, New York University, United States b California Institute of Technology, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Mail code 228-77, Pasadena, CA 91125, United States c Mathematica, 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 920, Chicago, IL 60601, United States d New York University, 19 W 4th Street, New York, NY 10012,(More)
One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to and do engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal. We(More)
Existing evidence suggests that returns to entrepreneurship are low relative to the returns to wage work. These findings have been associated with non-pecuniary benefits, and more generally with heterogeneity in preferences, rationality or beliefs. In this paper I challenge this view. I extend the data and show that the differential in earnings is in fact(More)
We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates’ ideologies from observing candidates’ campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates’ types depends on the visibility of(More)
Proof to Proposition 1. We first show that, when players care enough about future rounds, exclusion of a player from future coalitions is a credible threat, sustainable as part of a SPE. Let Z denote an arbitrary subgame of one of our games. We say that player i is “excluded in subgame Z” if in every period t along the path of play of the subgame, xt i = 0.(More)