Chloe Tergiman

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a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjects' beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subject's true cognitive level(More)
We introduce a new experimental design to provide insight into strategic choice in one shot games. We incentivize and observe provisional choices in the 2/3 guessing game in the period after the structure of the game has been communicated. We define as naive those who play dominated strategies well after we have communicated the structure of the game. We(More)
Existing evidence suggests that returns to entrepreneurship are low relative to the returns to wage work. These findings have been associated with non-pecuniary benefits, and more generally with heterogeneity in preferences, rationality or beliefs. In this paper I challenge this view. I extend the data and show that the differential in earnings is in fact(More)
We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates' ideologies from observing candidates' campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates' types depends on the visibility of(More)
One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to-and do-engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal. We(More)
Individuals often tend to conform to the choices of others in group decisions , compared to choices made in isolation, giving rise to phenomena such as group polarization and the bandwagon e↵ect. We show that this behavior, which we term the consensus e↵ect, is equivalent to a well-known violation of expected utility, namely strict quasi-convexity of(More)
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