Ching-to Albert Ma

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In a model of spatial competition, we analyse the equilibrium outcomes in markets where the product price is exogenous. Using an extended version of the Hotelling model, we assume that firms choose their locations and the quality of the product they supply. We derive the optimal price set by a welfarist regulator and find that this (second-best) price(More)
We consider a model of insurance and collusion. Efficient risk sharing requires the consumer to get a monetary compensation in case of a loss. But this in turn implies consumer–provider collusion incentives to submit false claims to the insurer. We assume, however, that only some providers are collusive while some are honest, and determine the optimal(More)
This paper considers a public provider's strategic use of rationing in a market served by both public and private providers. Such a 'mixed' market structure is common in many industries such as health care, telecommunication, postal service, and public utilities. The technology in the private sector exhibits increasing returns: each firm can expend 'effort'(More)
A model of vertical integration is studied. Upstream firms sell differentiated inputs; downstream firms bundle them to make final products. Downstream products are sold as option contracts, which allow consumers to choose from a set of commodities at predetermined prices. The model is illustrated by examples in telecommunication and health markets.(More)
We study dual job incentives with a focus on public-service physicians referring patients to their private practices. We call this moonlighting. Not all physicians moonlight; we introduce a group of dedicated doctors who in the base models behave nonstrategically in the public system. Allowing moonlighting can always enhance aggregate welfare. The(More)
  • Gary Biglaiser, Ching-To Albert Ma, Larry Ausubel, Alison Hagy, Tom Mcguire, Regis Renault +1 other
  • 2001
for helpful conversations, and seminar participants at many universities and conferences for their comments. Editor Joe Harrington and two referees gave us very valuable comments and suggestions. Abstract We analyze a model where Þrms compete with prices and qualities in markets consisting of consumers with heterogenous preferences and cost characteristics.(More)
  • Philippe Choné, Ching-To Albert Ma, Richard Frank, Yuk-Fai Fong, Billy Jack, Tom Mcguire +1 other
  • 2009
We model asymmetric information arising from physician agency, and its effect on the design of payment and health care quantity. The physician-patient coalition aims to maximize a combination of physician profit and patient benefit. The degree of substitution between profit and patient benefit in the physician-patient coalition is the physician's private(More)
A health care provider chooses unobservable service-quality and cost-reduction efforts. The efforts produce quality and cost efficiency. An insurer observes quality and cost, and chooses how to disclose this information to consumers. The insurer also decides how to pay the provider. In prospective payment, the insurer fully discloses quality, and sets a(More)