Ching-Hua Chen-Ritzo

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T majority of reverse auctions for procurement use a single-attribute (price) format while providing constraints on nonprice attributes such as quality and lead time. Alternatively, a buyer could choose to conduct a multiattribute auction where bidders can specify both a price and levels of nonprice attributes. While such an auction may provide higher(More)
We describe a discrete event simulator developed for daily prediction of WIP position in an operational 300mm wafer fabrication factory to support tactical decision-making. The simulator is distinctive in that its intended prediction horizon is relatively short, on the order of a few days, while its modeling scope is relatively large. The simulation(More)
The use of reverse auctions for procurement activities has grown tremendously over the last several years. The majority of these auctions use a single dimension (price) format while providing constraints on non-price attributes such as quality and lead time. In this research, we present an auction mechanism for a buyer whose utility function is known and(More)
We present a general simulation framework designed for modeling incentives in a health care delivery system. This first version of the framework focuses on representing provider incentives. Key framework components are described in detail, and we provide an overview of how data-driven analytic methods can be integrated with this framework to enable(More)
An important healthcare problem in the United States of America is that of emergency department overcrowding. A plausible explanation for such overcrowding is that the lack of access to primary care, which may be influenced by one’s insurance status, leads to greater use of emergency departments. Additionally, it has been suggested that the inappropriate(More)
At WinterSim 2011, we originally proposed an agent-based framework for healthcare simulations, enabling flexible integration of multiple simulation models, including models of disease progression, effects of provider interventions, and provider behavior models that are responsive to contractual incentives. In this paper, we report results using our proposed(More)
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