Learn More
Many Web information services utilize techniques of information extraction(IE) to collect important facts from the Web. To create more advanced services, one possible method is to discover thematic information from the collected facts through text classification. However, most conventional text classification techniques rely on manual-labelled corpora and(More)
Text classification is a task having been extensively studied for decades. However, most previous work pre-assumes the existence of explicitly-labeled corpora. In this study, we focus on the issue of automatic corpora acquisition. We propose an Web-based mining approach to collect necessary corpora, which can be greatly useful to both common users and(More)
In routing games with infinitesimal players, it follows from well-known convexity arguments that equilibria exist and are unique (up to induced delays, and under weak assumptions on delay functions). In routing games with players that control large amounts of flow, uniqueness has been demonstrated only in limited cases: in 2-terminal, nearly-parallel(More)
We introduce a bidding language for expressing negative value externalities in position auctions for online advertising. The unit-bidder constraints (UBC) language allows a bidder to condition a bid on its allocated slot and on the slots allocated to other bidders. We introduce a natural extension of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, the(More)
Let G = (V, E) be a graph with positive integral edge weights. Our problem is to find a matching of maximum weight in G. We present a simple iterative algorithm for this problem that uses a maximum cardinality matching algorithm as a subroutine. Using the current fastest maximum cardinality matching algorithms, we solve the maximum weight matching problem(More)
We study the quality of equilibrium in atomic splittable routing games. We show that in single-source single-sink games on series-parallel graphs, the price of collusion — the ratio of the total delay of atomic Nash equilibrium to the Wardrop equilibrium — is at most 1. This proves that the existing bounds on the price of anarchy for Wardrop equilibria(More)
We investigate the following problem: given a set of jobs and a set of people with preferences over the jobs, what is the optimal way of matching people to jobs? Here we consider the notion of popularity. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M such that more people prefer M to M than the other way around. Determining whether a given instance(More)