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We consider the following variant of the speed scaling problem introduced by Yao, Demers, and Shenker. We are given a set of jobs and we have a variable-speed processor to process them. The higher the processor speed, the higher the energy consumption. Each job is associated with its own release time, deadline, and processing volume. The objective is to… (More)

Many Web information services utilize techniques of information extraction(IE) to collect important facts from the Web. To create more advanced services, one possible method is to discover thematic information from the collected facts through text classification. However, most conventional text classification techniques rely on manual-labelled corpora and… (More)

We investigate coordination mechanisms that schedule n jobs on m unrelated machines. The objective is to minimize the latest completion of all jobs, i.e., the makespan. It is known that if the mechanism is non-preemptive, the price of anarchy is Ω(log m). Both Azar, Jain, and Mirrokni (SODA 2008) and Caragiannis (SODA 2009) raised the question whether it is… (More)

We present an algorithm to solve the group mutual exclusion, problem in the cache-coherent (CC) model. For the same problem in the distributed shared memory (DSM) model, Danek and Hadzilacos presented algorithms of <i>O(n)</i> remote memory references (RMR) and proved a matching lower bound, where <i>n</i> is the number of processes. We show that in the CC… (More)

This paper addresses strategies for the stable marriage problem. For the Gale-Shapley algorithm with men proposing, a classical theorem states that it is impossible for every cheating man to get a better partner than the one he gets if everyone is truthful. We study how to circumvent this theorem and incite men to cheat. First we devise coalitions in which… (More)

In routing games with infinitesimal players, it follows from well-known convexity arguments that equilibria exist and are unique (up to induced delays, and under weak assumptions on delay functions). In routing games with players that control large amounts of flow, uniqueness has been demonstrated only in limited cases: in 2-terminal, nearly-parallel… (More)

We study the quality of equilibrium in atomic splittable routing games. We show that in single-source single-sink games on series-parallel graphs, the price of collusion — the ratio of the total delay of atomic Nash equilibrium to the Wardrop equilibrium — is at most 1. This proves that the existing bounds on the price of anarchy for Wardrop equilibria… (More)

We introduce a bidding language for expressing negative value externalities in position auctions for online advertising. The unit-bidder constraints (UBC) language allows a bidder to condition a bid on its allocated slot and on the slots allocated to other bidders. We introduce a natural extension of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, the… (More)

We study how collusion affects the social cost in atomic splittable routing games. Suppose that players form coalitions and each coalition behaves as if it were a single player controlling all the flows of its participants. We investigate the following question: under what conditions would the social cost of the post-collusion equilibrium be bounded by the… (More)