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Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination
TLDR
We study experimentally a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games, with both mutual cooperation and mutual defection as Nash equilibria in the stage-2 game. Expand
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Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures
Abstract I consider a cooperation-formation game in which players choose independently with whom they wish to cooperate in a given coalitional game, and players' payoffs follow a solution imposed onExpand
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The Inner Core of an n-Person Game
Sufficient conditions for a general n-person game to have a nonempty inner core are established. They relate to the balancedness condition and characterize a class of NTU games that is larger thanExpand
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The Inner Core and the Strictly Inhibitive Set
Abstract The inner core, motivated by the study of competitive outcomes in the cores of market games, is shown to be contained in the strictly inhibitive set, and coincides with the strictlyExpand
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Equilibrium Prices When the Sunspot Variable Is Continuous
TLDR
We analyze sunspot-equilibrium prices in nonconvex economies with perfect markets and a continuous sunspot variable. Expand
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On a Market for Coalitions with Indivisible Agents and Lotteries
Abstract Given a game, the set of joint lotteries over partitions of the agents of any subgame induces a subset of the vectors of balancing weights for the subgame. Games whose subgames are allExpand
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A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games
It is shown that for every NTUmarket game, there is amarket thatrepresents the game whosecompetitive payoff vectors completely fill up theinner core of the game. It is also shown that for every NTUExpand
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On Market Games When Agents Cannot Be in Two Places at Once
TLDR
We show that a coalitional game can be generated by such a market if and only if the characteristic function of the game is superadditive. Expand
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On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals
This paper looks at cooperation structures that result from a strategic game where players make simultaneous proposals for cooperation. We identify cooperation structures that maximize the potentialExpand
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Inducing Cooperation by Self-Stipulated Penalties
This paper considers an approach for inducing cooperation in prisoneri¯s dilemma. The approach is based on players individually committing to pay self-stipulated penalties for defection. We provide aExpand
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