Charles Hadlock

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Newly released data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within-country variation, with the variation increasing as legal environment gets less investor friendly. This paper examines why firms practice high-quality governance when law does not require it; firm attributes related to the quality of governance; how the attributes(More)
We study managerial style effects in a large panel of Compustat firms from 1990 to 2007. We find that policy changes after exogenous CEO departures do not display abnormally high levels of variability, casting doubt on the hypothesis that unanticipated idiosyncratic managerial style effects have a substantive impact on corporate policies. For endogenous CEO(More)
We examine whether an increase in focus is an explanation for the stock market gains associated with spino!s. For a sample of 155 spino!s between the years 1975 and 1991, we "nd that the announcement period as well the long-run abnormal returns for the focus-increasing spino!s are signi"cantly larger than the corresponding abnormal returns for the(More)
We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly-traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership rises from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and(More)
New regulations and corporate governance activists have called for more outside directors on boards and committees, yet existing research has failed to find convincing evidence that outside directors improve firm performance. This paper estimates the effect of outside directors using a new empirical strategy that controls for the well known endogeneity(More)
Managers frequently cite the desire to mitigate asymmetric information as a motivation for increasing firm focus. The information benefits of focus appear relevant for the subset of firms that actually increase their focus; however, the relevance of focus-related information benefits for the population of diversified firms is an open question. This paper(More)
In this paper we present a theory and some empirical evidence on stock price manipulation in the United States. Extending the framework of Allen and Gale (1992), we consider what happens when a manipulator can trade in the presence of other traders who seek out information about the stock’s true value. In a market without manipulators, these information(More)
This paper is the first study of long-run evolution of investor protection, equity financing and corporate ownership in the U.K. over the 20 century. Formal regulation only emerged in the second half of the century. We assess its influence on finance and ownership by comparing evolution of firms incorporating at different stages of the century. Regulation(More)
We argue that powerful CEOs induce their boards to shift the weight on performance measures towards the better performing measures, thereby rigging the incentive part of their pay. The intuition is developed in a simple model in which some powerful CEOs exploit superior information and lack of transparency in compensation contracts to extract rents. The(More)