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This paper proposes an experimental approach to studying different aspects of discrimination. We let participants play various games with opponents of distinct ethnic afliation. Strategies based upon such ethnic afliation provide direct evidence of ethnic discrimination. This approach was utilized to study ethnic discrimination in Israeli Jewish society.(More)
Open source software (OSS) is an economic paradox. Development of open source software is often done by unpaid volunteers and the " source code " is typically freely available. Surveys suggest that status, signaling, and intrinsic motivations play an important role in inducing developers to invest effort. Contribution to an OSS project is rewarded by adding(More)
We present a dynamic model of the hospital industry in which nonprofit and for-profit hospitals coexist and compete and are differentiated by their objective functions, investment technologies, and taxation rates. In our model, patients differ by income and type of insurance coverage, and choose admission to their preferred hospital, while hospitals choose(More)
This paper investigates the implications of social rewards on the allocation of talent in society and consequently on the process of economic growth. We consider two sources of heterogeneity among workers: nonwage income and innate ability. A greater emphasis on status may induce the "wrong" individuals, that is, those with low ability and high wealth, to(More)
We examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. We show that when the proposer uses a delegate, her share increases both when the delegate is optional or mandatory. This is true despite the fact that the delegate cannot be used as a commitment device. We also show that unobserved delegation by the responder reduces her(More)
We develop an experimental test to distinguish between discrimination against and nepotism. The experiment compares the behavior toward individuals of different groups with the behavior toward anonymous individuals (those having no clear group affiliation). Not only is the distinction between the different types of discrimination important for the study of(More)
This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmet-ric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races, among others. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in these games, and apply it to study competitions(More)
The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model in which players decide on search procedures for a prize located in one of a set of labeled boxes. The prize is awarded to the player who finds it first. A player can decide on the number of (costly) search units he employs and on the order in which he conducts the search. It is shown that in equilibrium, the(More)