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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed toExpand
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The Nonparametric Approach to Applied Welfare Analysis
Changes in total surplus are traditional measures of economic welfare. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizing individual and aggregate consumer demand data with individualExpand
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GENDER DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSE TO BIG STAKES
It is commonly perceived that increasing incentives improves performance. However, the reaction to increased incentives might differ between men and women, leading to gender differences inExpand
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Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives
We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasibleExpand
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The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona
The Boston mechanism is a school allocation procedure that is widely used around the world. To resolve overdemands, priority is often given to families who live in the neighborhood school. We noteExpand
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Decentralizing Equality of Opportunity
In a global justice problem, equality of opportunity is satisfied if individual well-being is independent of exogenous irrelevant characteristics. Policymakers, however, address questions involvingExpand
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Priorities in school choice: The case of the Boston mechanism in Barcelona
The Boston mechanism is a school allocation procedure that is widely used around the world and has been criticized for its incentive problems. In order to resolve overdemands for a given school, mostExpand
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Catchment areas and access to better schools
We compare popular school choice mechanisms in terms of children's access to better schools (ABS) than their catchment area school, in districts with school stratification and where priority is givenExpand
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School Choice Mechanisms, Peer Effects and Sorting
We study the effects that school choice mechanisms and school priorities have on the degree of sorting of students across schools and neighborhoods, when school quality is endogenously determined byExpand
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Sorting in public school districts under the Boston Mechanism
We show that the widely used Boston Mechanism (BM) fosters ability and socioeconomic segregation across otherwise identical public schools, even when schools do not have priorities over localExpand
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