Carolyn Pitchik

Learn More
We study interactive situations in which players are boundedly rational. Each player, rather than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior, as in the theory of Nash equilibrium, uses the following choice procedure. She rst associates one consequence with each of her actions by sampling (literally or virtually) each of her actions once.(More)
In the common agency problem multiple mechanism designers simultaneously attempt to control the behavior of a single privately informed agent. The paper shows that the allocations associated with equilibria relative to any ad hoc set of feasible mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria relative to (some subset of) the set of menus. Furthermore, equilibria(More)
Criminal activity can be controlled by punishment, and by social expenditure both on enforcement and redistributive transfers which increase the opportunity cost of imprisonment. Individuals may diier in the combinations of these policies that they prefer. We study the dependence of these preferences on the individuals' characteristics and the nature of the(More)
Recent studies have found evidence linking Africa's current under-development to colonial rule and the slave trade. Given that these events ended long ago, why do they continue to matter today? I develop a model, exhibiting path dependence, that explains how these past events could have lasting impacts. The model has multiple equi-libria: one equilibrium(More)
In an innnite horizon model, a leader of a group of citizens exerts eeort in each period to maintain a public good that enhances the proots of a group of kingmakers. In each period, the kingmakers decide whether to overthrow the leader so as to have a chance of becoming the leader. Consistent with the empirical literature, we nd that (1) leadership turnover(More)
In this paper, we compare an n-firm Cournot game with a Stackelberg model, where n-firms choose outputs sequentially, in a stochastic demand environment with private information. The Stackelberg perfect revealing equilibrium expected output and total surplus are lower while expected price and total profits are higher than the Cournot equilibrium ones(More)
We develop a financial market trading model in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that allows us to incorporate non-trivial volume. We observe that in this model price volatility is positively related to the trading volume and to the absolute value of the net order flow, i.e. the order imbalance. Moreover, higher volume leads to higher order(More)