Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

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We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the identity of the members of the coalition they are members of. We study rules that associate to each profile of agents' preferences a partition of the society. We are interested in rules that never provide incentives(More)
This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interaction between the pre-and post-merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from infor-mational asymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and problems of cooperation and coordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree to merge(More)
Paired Kidney Exchange programs (PKEs) solve incompatibility problems of donor-patient pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among several pairs. Further efficiency gains may emerge if PKEs consider the quality of the matches between patients and donors. Limitations on the number of simultaneous required operations(More)
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