Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

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We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the identity of the members of the coalition they are members of. We study rules that associate to each profile of agents' preferences a partition of the society. We are interested in rules that never provide incentives(More)
Paired Kidney Exchange programs (PKEs) solve incompatibility problems of donor-patient pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among several pairs. Further efficiency gains may emerge if PKEs consider the quality of the matches between patients and donors. Limitations on the number of simultaneous required operations(More)
We consider a model of Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) with feasibility con-<lb>straints on the number of patient-donor pairs involved in exchanges. Patients’<lb>preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger<lb>donors to kidneys from older donors. In this framework, patients with compati-<lb>ble donors may enroll on PKE(More)
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