Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

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We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents’ preferences only depend on the identity of the members of the coalition they are members of. We study rules that associate to each profile of agents’ preferences a partition of the society. We are interested in rules that never provide incentives(More)
Duggan and Schwartz (Soc Choice andWelfare 17:85–93, 2000) have proposed a generalization of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem to multivalued social choice rules. They show that only dictatorial rules are strategyproof and satisfy citizens sovereignty and residual resoluteness. Citizens sovereignty requires that each alternative is chosen at some preference(More)
This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interaction between the preand post-merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from informational asymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and problems of cooperation and coordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree to merge and(More)
Paired Kidney Exchange programs (PKEs) solve incompatibility problems of donor-patient pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among several pairs. Further efficiency gains may emerge if PKEs consider the quality of the matches between patients and donors. Limitations on the number of simultaneous required operations(More)
We consider a model of Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) with feasibility con-<lb>straints on the number of patient-donor pairs involved in exchanges. Patients’<lb>preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger<lb>donors to kidneys from older donors. In this framework, patients with compati-<lb>ble donors may enroll on PKE(More)
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