Carlos Hervés-Beloso

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We associate to any pure exchange economy a game with only two players, regardless of the number of consumers. In this two-player game, each player represents a different role of the society, which is formed by all the individuals in the economy. Player 1 selects feasible allocations trying to make Pareto improvements. Player 2 chooses an alternative from(More)
We consider a continuum economy with infinitely many commodities and show that, for any positive =, the core of the economy coincides with the set of allocations which are not blocked by any coalition with measure less than =. Actually, our main result is an extension of Grodal's (1972, Econometrica 40, 581 583) result and, therefore, Schmeidler's (1972,(More)
It is difficult to argue that coalition formation is costless and free. In this paper, only a subset of the set of all possible coalitions in an economy or a game, is considered to be really formed. The consequences that such restriction has on the veto mechanism are analyzed. The restricted veto mechanism is extended to the pondered veto mechanism with(More)
We study general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. Trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. It is useful to define a list of bundles as a derivative good that gives an agent the right to receive one of the bundles in the list. Enforceable trade agreements can be described by Pimeasurable plans of(More)
We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim is to describe the equilibrium price formation and how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. For it, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the ShapleyShubik(More)
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