Carlos Hervés-Beloso

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In a pure exchange economy with differential information and a finite set of traders, physical commodities and states of nature, we characterize the Walrasian expectations or Radner equilibria by using the veto power of the grand coalition. We prove that an allocation x is a Radner equilibrium allocation if and only if it is " privately non-dominated " by(More)
We develop a model of general equilibrium with trade ex ante in a context of private and incomplete state verification. Instead of choosing bundles, agents choose lists of bundles out of which the market then selects one bundle for delivery. With agents having subjective expectations about the bundle that will be delivered, we study existence of a(More)
their useful suggestions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her careful reading and useful suggestions. (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER) and SA070A05 (Junta de Castilla y León). 1 Abstract. We associate to any pure exchange economy a game with only two players, regardless of the number of consumers. In this two-player game, each(More)
We study general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. Trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. It is useful to define a list of bundles as a derivative good that gives an agent the right to receive one of the bundles in the list. Enforceable trade agreements can be described by P i-measurable plans of(More)
Vieille for many helpful discussions during the writing of this paper and especially to John Duggan whose diligent reading of the manuscript lead to the correction of several errors and to many improvements in the paper. Finally, I thank seminar participants at Exeter,
We consider a continuum economy with infinitely many commodities and show that, for any positive =, the core of the economy coincides with the set of allocations which are not blocked by any coalition with measure less than =. Actually, our main result is an extension of Grodal's (1972, Econometrica 40, 5811583) result and, therefore, Schmeidler's (1972,(More)
This paper studies general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. All trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. Agents buy lists of bundles that give them the right to receive one of the bundles. With rational expectations, that is, knowledge of the selection mechanism, agents can predict which bundle(More)
(Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER), SA0870A08 (Junta de Castilla y León), and PGIDIT07PXIB300095PR (Xunta de Galicia). Abstract. We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim is to describe the equilibrium price formation and how the lack(More)