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The existence of von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions (stable sets) for bilateral assignment markets is an unsolved question since Shapley and Shubik (1972). In 1984 Shubik proposed to consider, for each optimal matching, the union of the core of the game and the core of the subgames that are compatible with this matching. We prove in the present paper that(More)
We extend Rochford's (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise-bargained equilibrium to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to a negotiation process among all agents based on what every agent could receive-and use as a(More)
We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and aggregate monotonicity. Furthermore , we show that these two properties are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player property and the symmetry property. We …nish characterizing single-valued solutions satisfying these …ve(More)