Carl R. Elks

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Transient faults (also known as soft-errors) resulting from high-energy particle strikes on silicon are typically modeled as single bit-flips in memory arrays. Most Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) analyses assume this model. However, accelerated radiation tests on static random access memory (SRAM) arrays built using modern technologies show(More)
Semiconductor devices are becoming more susceptible to single event upsets (SEUs) as device dimensions, operating voltages and frequencies are scaled. The majority of architecture-, logic- and circuit-level techniques that have been developed to address SEUs in logic assume a single-point fault model. This will soon be insufficient as the occurrence of(More)
Existing nuclear power generation facilities are currently seeking to replace obsolete analog Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems with contemporary digital and processor based systems. However, as new technology is introduced into existing and new plants, it becomes vital to assess the impact of that technology on plant safety. From a regulatory(More)
Dean of the Graduate School ______________________________________ DEDICATION To my parents Donald and Monica and youngest brother Bruce whom we miss very much and dearly love. Also, to my sister Mary and her three daughters Josie, Danny and Alicia. Finally, to my brother Larry who I love and ask that God have mercy on us both. Bryant et al.). I am very(More)
Fault injection methods have long been used to assess fault tolerance and safety. However, many conventional fault injection methods face significant shortcomings, which hinder their ability to execute fault injections on target real-time safety-critical systems. We demonstrate a novel fault injection system implemented on a commercial Field-Programmable(More)
Evaluating the security of cyber-physical systems throughout their life cycle is necessary to assure that they can be deployed and operated in safety-critical applications, such as infrastructure, military, and transportation. Most safety and security decisions that can have major effects on mitigation strategy options after deployment are made early in the(More)
The security of cyber-physical systems is first and foremost a safety problem, yet it is typically handled as a traditional security problem, which means that solutions are based on defending against threats and are often implemented too late. This approach neglects to take into consideration the context in which the system is intended to operate, thus(More)
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