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In the remember-know paradigm for studying recognition memory, participants distinguish items whose presentations are episodically remembered from those that are merely familiar. A one-dimensional model postulates that remember responses are just high-confidence old judgments, but a meta-analysis of 373 experiments shows that the receiver operating(More)
Recognition memory judgments have long been assumed to depend on the contributions of two underlying processes: recollection and familiarity. We measured recollection with receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) data and remember-know judgments. Under standard remember-know instructions, the two estimates of recollection diverged. When subjects were told(More)
We investigated the role that memory strength plays in the decision process by examining the extent to which strength is used as a cue to dynamically modify recognition criteria. The study list consisted of strong and weak items, with strength a function of study duration or repetition. The recognition test list was divided into two consecutive blocks;(More)
A belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983) is observed when subjects accept more valid than invalid arguments and more believable than unbelievable conclusions and show greater overall accuracy in judging arguments with unbelievable conclusions. The effect is measured with a contrast of contrasts, comparing the(More)
Do remembering and knowing differ qualitatively (reflecting distinct underlying processes) or quantitatively (reflecting different levels of strength)? Broadly speaking, models of remember-know judgments based on these alternatives have been tested by examining the proportion of remember and know responses that are made across conditions or levels of(More)
Experiments often produce a hit rate and a false alarm rate in each of two conditions. These response rates are summarized into a single-point sensitivity measure such as d', and t tests are conducted to test for experimental effects. Using large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we evaluate the Type I error rates and power that result from four commonly used(More)
Two-process accounts of recognition memory assume that memory judgments are based on both a rapidly available familiarity-based process and a slower, more accurate, recall-based mechanism. Past experiments on the time course of item recognition have not supported the recall-to-reject account of the second process, in which the retrieval of an old item is(More)
Viewers looked at print advertisements as their eye movements were recorded. Half of them were told to pay special attention to car ads, and the other half were told to pay special attention to skin-care ads. Viewers tended to spend more time looking at the text than the picture part of the ad, though they did spend more time looking at the type of ad they(More)
Recent studies have demonstrated that emotional stimuli result in a higher proportion of recognized items that are "remembered" (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Ochsner, 2000), leading to greater estimates of recollection by the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994). This result suggests that recognition judgments to emotional stimuli depend on a(More)
According to two-process accounts of recognition memory, a familiarity-based process is followed by a slower, more accurate, recall-like process. The dominant two-process account is the recall-to-reject account, in which this second process facilitates the rejection of similar foils. To evaluate the recall-to-reject account, we reanalyzed two experiments(More)