C. R. Knoeber

Publications34
h-index16
Citations5,228
Highly Influential Citations442
Claim Author Page
Author pages are created from data sourced from our academic publisher partnerships and public sources.

Recommended Authors

  • A. Agrawal
  • 55 Publications, 11,056 Citations
  • E. Lazear
  • 177 Publications, 22,442 Citations
  • Eugene F. Fama
  • 146 Publications, 167,933 Citations
  • J. Karpoff
  • 82 Publications, 11,477 Citations
  • Publications
  • Influence
Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders
This paper examines the use of seven mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. These mechanisms are: shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large blockholders;… Expand
  • 2,776
  • 282
Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?*
If outside directors with backgrounds in politics and in law play a political role, they will be more important on the boards of firms for which politics matters more. We conduct three tests. First,… Expand
  • 811
  • 61
  • PDF
Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and
This paper examines the use of seven mechanisms to control agency problems between man? agers and shareholders. These mechanisms are: shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large blockholders;… Expand
  • 151
  • 40
Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers
A common view of golden parachutes and shark repellents is that they are designed by management to insulate itself from the discipline imposed by the market for corporate control and so are harmful… Expand
  • 216
  • 13
Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production
Broiler chickens are raised by contract growers whose rewards depend explicitly upon relative performance. We use data on the performance of broiler producers facing both tournament and linear… Expand
  • 356
  • 12
Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover
A greater threat of takeover has two opposing effects on managerial compensation. The competition effect in the market for managers reduces compensation. The risk effect increases compensation by… Expand
  • 137
  • 11
  • PDF
A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers
  • 193
  • 8
Understanding Retained Patronage Refunds in Agricultural Cooperatives
The share of patronage refunds retained by an agricultural cooperative is modeled as arising from the portfolio decision of its median member. The member is viewed as maximizing expected utility by… Expand
  • 61
  • 4
Outside Directors, Politics, and Firm Performance
A substantial number of outside directors have experience in non-business arenas, especially in government and in the private practice of law. Moreover, for most of these directors, the entirety of… Expand
  • 30
  • 3
Explaining State Bans on Corporate Farming
State laws banning corporate farming present a puzzle for a rent-seeking explanation of political outcomes since family farmer proponents may receive no direct benefit from these bans. An… Expand
  • 16
  • 2